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Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies:
The Need for a Better Standard
Jeffrey K. Vandervoort
"If truth were not often suggested by error, if old implements could
not be adjusted to new uses, human progress would be slow."
Oliver Wendell Holmes
The Common Law, 18811
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the limited liability company ("LLC") has come
a flurry of changes in tax law, business law, and administrative proce-
dure in an attempt to adapt our system to this new form of entity.
From the date of the LLC's arrival in the United States, changes were
necessary due in part to the fact that the LLC is essentially a hybrid,
combining characteristics of both partnerships and corporations. As
such, the LLC could not be easily categorized by regulators, courts
and legislators. The statutory grant of limited liability to an unincor-
porated entity is one example of how the law has changed. From a tax
perspective, in 1996, the Treasury Department and the IRS made a
monumental change in issuing the "Check the Box" regulations, effec-
tively giving taxpayers the ability to select the tax treatment for their
eligible LLC.
Yet despite the significant changes that have been made to welcome
the LLC into the business mainstream, other areas have lagged be-
hind. One such area is the equitable doctrine of piercing the veil of
limited liability. Borrowing from the common law of corporations,
state legislatures and courts have opted to apply the doctrine of pierc-
ing the corporate veil to LLC's. However, application of the piercing
standards to LLC's has not exactly been smooth sailing. As this arti-
cle will discuss in greater detail, courts and legislatures have had to
consider the fact that some of the traditional veil piercing standards
that appear to make sense in the context of corporations, do not make
sense in the context of the LLC. For some commentators, this lack of
"fit" between the corporate veil piercing standards and the LLC has
called the entire system into question.
1. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER, 37 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986).
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In many states, the LLC statutes are fast approaching their ten year
anniversary of enactment. Despite this fact, to this date, our judiciary
has been given very little guidance as to the proper analysis to apply in
assessing a claim to pierce the veil of an LLC. Considering the poten-
tially ruinous implications that veil piercings can have on an individ-
ual, the uncertainty in this area appears to be crying out for immediate
attention. It has been said before, and I will emphatically repeat it
now, this issue is ripe for serious consideration, debate and possible
reform.2 The time is right for consideration of a new and improved
standard for piercing the veil of LLC's, one that is tailored specifically
to account for the unique characteristics of the LLC.
Change for the sake of change, however, is not necessarily a good
thing.3 Change, especially change in the law, must be made with the
goal of advancement of a worthwhile cause and betterment of societal
interests. It is our challenge to: (1) reflect on the underlying principles
of limited liability; (2) consider the unique characteristics of the LLC;
(3) learn from the well-developed body of case law on piercing the
corporate veil; and (4) engineer a better standard for assessing claims
to pierce the veil of an LLC. In furtherance of these goals, John
Matheson ("Matheson") and Richard Eby ("Eby") have proposed a
Model Standard ("Matheson-Eby Model Standard") in an effort to
start a dialogue on these issues.4 This article will discuss the features
of the Matheson-Eby Model Standard, analyze its effectiveness, and
propose revisions that would improve the standard.
Section II of this article will discuss the principles of limited liability
and their impact on this debate. Section III will introduce and briefly
discuss the exceptions to limited liability. Section IV will analyze the
common law factors used to pierce the veil of corporations. Section V
will present a brief history of the limited liability company. Section VI
2. "This desultory state of the common law would itself be reason enough for clarification or
reform. Business owners have never had much guidance regarding what activities will result in a
loss of limited liability. The stakes are much more significant today, however, as presumptive
limited liability for business owners has become the norm through the proliferation of new forms
of limited liability entities (LLEs)." John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of
Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the
Test For Waiving Owners' Limited-Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 150 (2000). "The
veil piercing theory as it has been applied is so seriously flawed that the time has come to recon-
sider the use of the common law concept at all. It is time for the adoption of a coherent method
to deal with the perceived unfairness in risk allocation for all entities with limited liability protec-
tion." Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the
Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 95, 96 (2001).
3. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 38 ("Change for the sake of change is not neces-
sarily good. But, change to adapt to the situation is survival.") (quoting Adapt - or Lose!, XL
Ohio State Bar Association Report 639, 646 (May 22, 1967)).
4. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 183.
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will discuss the treatment of the piercing issue by various state stat-
utes. Section VII will analyze the application of the corporate veil
piercing factors to LLC's. Section VIII will survey recent case law on
piercing the LLC veil and develop a few common themes that can be
drawn from the cases. Section IX will present the case that a new
standard for piercing the veil of LLC's is needed. Section X will intro-
duce and discuss the Model Standard proposed by Matheson and Eby,
and then propose revisions to the standard that will make it more ef-
fective and perhaps more palatable to critics.
II. LIMITED LIABILITY
The debate over the standards used for piercing the corporate veil
has its roots in the policies of a closely related debate.. .that of limited
liability.5 For the corporate shareholder or member of an LLC, lim-
ited liability means that you are not liable for the debts and obliga-
tions of the enterprise. 6 Practically speaking, limited liability refers to
the ability of a shareholder or interest holder of an LLC to risk only
the capital that such individual invests in the entity.
7
Limited liability was originally derived, among other things, to en-
courage economic expansion through investment. 8 Following the In-
dustrial Revolution, capital-intensive businesses required substantial
amounts of capital that regularly exceeded the means of the typical
entrepreneur. 9 One way to fulfill this need was to encourage outside
investment. Granting limited liability to those who contributed the
capital encouraged such investment, because investors could invest
without risking all their personal assets.10 While investors were often
willing to risk their entire net worth to businesses they operated, in-
vestors, absent limited liability, were not willing to invest such value in
5. See, e.g. David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company:
How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibil-
ity and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 429
(1998) ("The history of the firm illustrates the tension between the conflicting goals that Ameri-
can society set for corporations. On the one hand, Americans wished to promote efficient wealth
maximization by as broad a range of people as possible. On the other, Americans wanted to
regulate the firm in order to protect those who lost out on that wealth creation.").
6. Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 7 (1997).
7. Huss, supra note 2, at 103.
8. Stephen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil § 1.06 (1993), cited in Eric Fox, Piercing the
Veil of Limited Liability Companies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1154 (1994).
9. Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Liability
Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 56 (1994); Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 155.
10. Bahls, supra note 9, at 56.
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businesses that they did not operate or closely monitor.1' With lim-
ited liability, owners are set free to invest in various business ventures
without the need to incur the excessive costs necessary to monitor
each enterprise closely. 12
Further support for limited liability based on economic principles
can be found in the work of Frank H. Easterbrook ("Easterbrook")
and Daniel R. Fischel ("Fischel"). In their often-cited book, The Eco-
nomic Structure of Corporate Law, Easterbrook and Fischel advance
the theory that limited liability reduces the transaction costs that arise
due to the separation of agents and owners of capital and it enhances
the efficient and smooth running of the securities markets.13 This re-
sults in a lower cost of capital, which leads to increased economic out-
put and advancement of the public welfare. 14 The authors offer six
reasons in support of their theory: (1) limited liability reduces the en-
tity's and its shareholders' need to monitor its agents, which makes
passive investing and diversification a more rational strategy, reducing
the costs of operating the entity;15 (2) limited liability reduces the
need to monitor other shareholders to see whether they can properly
bear the risks that the entity plans or is undertaking; 16 (3) limited lia-
bility promotes the free transfer of shares, which creates incentives for
managers to act efficiently since the results of their inefficient actions
will be punished by the market;1 7 (4) limited liability makes shares
homogenous commodities that reflect all the information publicly
available about the entity, allowing trading on the same terms and
ensuring investors that the price reflects all available information;1 8
(5) limited liability allows for more efficient diversification of one's
assets;' 9 and (6) limited liability prevents managers from becoming
unduly risk averse. 20 As can be drawn from these six examples, the
key economic justification for limited liability is based on the premise
that apart from the simple shifting of loss from interest holders to
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 4, 40-59 (1991), quoted in Cohen, supra note 5, at 438.
14. Id.
15. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 41-42, quoted in Cohen, supra note 5, at 438.
16. EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 13, at 41-42, quoted in Cohen, supra note 5, at 438-
39.
17. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 42-43, quoted in Cohen, supra note 5, at 439.
18. EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 13, at 43, quoted in Cohen, supra note 5, at 438.
19. Id.
20. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 44, quoted in Cohen, supra note 5, at 439.
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creditors, there is a change in behavior due to the limited liability sta-
tus of interest holders. 21
In addition to the facilitation of capital investment and economic
efficiency, limited liability was favored for its ability to provide demo-
cratic access to capital and investment. 22 As one observer noted:
"[p]rior to limited liability, only the wealthiest investors could afford
the risk of personal liability."' 23 Once armed with the protection lim-
ited liability offered against personal liability, less affluent investors
were able to participate in the market. 24
With the growing popularity of limited liability, competition among
states soon took over as the main motivating factor behind new legis-
lation. Starting as early as the 1800's, and continuing on to this day,
lawmakers have argued that a state's failure to grant limited liability
to business owners would drive capital investment to other states.
25
Limited liability, however, has not come about without its share of
critics. One commentator described limited liability as a tale of two
conflicting goals.26 On the one hand, Americans sought to promote
efficient wealth maximization by as broad a range of people as possi-
ble.2 7 On the other hand, Americans wanted to regulate the business
enterprise in order to protect those who lost out on that wealth crea-
tion. 28 Historically, Americans have been suspicious of large and
powerful corporations and, despite the many highly proclaimed bene-
fits of the corporation, Americans have never quite overcome the
early and strong suspicion of corporations as hard-to-control entities
that are dangerous to the general public. 29 This sentiment can be seen
in the words of Thomas Cooper, in the 1800's, who described limited
liability as a "mode of swindling, quite common and honorable in
these United States" and "a fraud on the honest and confiding part of
the public."'30 Today, however, much of the criticism of limited liabil-
ity focuses on the concern that the liability protection creates a greater
incentive for managers of firms to engage in risky behavior.31 Critics
21. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 45.
22. Presser, supra note 8, § 1.06.
23. Presser, supra note 8, § 1.03[1].
24. Id.; Cohen, supra note 5, at 438; Huss, supra note 2, at 104.
25. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, 50 (1991),
quoted in Bahis, supra note 9, at 55.
26. Cohen, supra note 5, at 430.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 428.
30. HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 50 (quoting THOMAS COOPER, LECTURES ON THE ELE-
MENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 247-50 (2d ed. 1830)) (footnote omitted).
31. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 58, quoted in Cohen supra note 5, at 441.
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caution that managers of a limited liability firm, knowing that the bur-
den of risk will fall elsewhere, will engage in overly risky endeavors. 32
Nevertheless, based on a weighing of interests, legislators have repeat-
edly decided to accept these risks in order to reap the benefits of in-
creased capital investment and economic efficiency. As this article
moves into a discussion of the underlying policies of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil, many of these themes will resurface.
III. COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO LIMITED LIABILITY
A. Personal Conduct
Notwithstanding the statutory grant of limited liability to corporate
shareholders and LLC members, state common law has maintained
several important exceptions. First, regardless of a person's status as a
shareholder or member of an LLC, that person cannot escape liability
for his own personal conduct. 33 In the case of a tort, if a member of
an LLC commits a tort while in the course of LLC business, that per-
son can be held personally liable for that tort.34 Hence, the limited
liability shield provided by the LLC statute will not protect that per-
son from personal liability for his own acts. Individuals acting for
LLC's or corporations can also expect to be held personally liable for
criminal or otherwise wrongful conduct. 35
B. Agency or Collective Torts
Under agency principles, a shareholder or LLC member may be-
come personally liable for tort claims as a result of his or her own
negligence in appointing, supervising, or participating in the activity in
question with a manager, employee, agent or other member of the
corporation or LLC. 36 Under a similar concept known as the collec-
tive torts doctrine, tort victims may personally sue those individuals in
a business who can be identified as the central decision-makers in the
actionable conduct. 37 Once identified, the central decision-makers
can be held personally liable for their tortious conduct.38 While this
theory of liability may be difficult if not impossible to prove in a large
32. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 50, quoted in Cohen, supra note 5, at 439-
40.
33. Karin Schwindt, Limited Liability Companies: Issues in Member Liability, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1541, 1548 (1997).
34. Id; see also J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPA-
NIES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 42-43 (1994).
35. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 11.
36. See Bahls, supra note 9, at 59-60.
37. See Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1548.
38. Id.
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corporation, where it may not be feasible to single out responsible
individuals, the doctrine may be more of an issue for small, closely
held corporations and LLC's. 39
C. Personal Guarantee
Shareholders and LLC members must be aware of potential con-
tractual liability as well. While an LLC member will generally not be
held personally liable for contracts made on behalf of the LLC, a
member can become personally liable if they personally guarantee an
LLC obligation.40 With small, closely held start up companies, lend-
ing institutions and suppliers will often require a personal guarantee
until a credit history is established or valuable assets are accumu-
lated.41 Because of this marketplace reality, LLC members who pro-
vide personal guarantees may find themselves personally liable for the
obligations of the LLC.
D. Piercing the Corporate Veil
Finally, there is the doctrine known as piercing the corporate veil.
This doctrine comes from traditional principles of corporate common
law. The "corporate veil" is a metaphorical reference to the limited
liability of a corporation, based on the prevailing rule that when cor-
porate formalities are observed, initial financing is adequate, and the
corporation is not formed to defraud creditors or other third parties,
the corporate form will be respected and shareholders will not be lia-
ble for corporate debts and liabilities.42 Under the piercing principles,
which are based in equity, the corporate veil will be pierced and the
entity disregarded when the corporation is used as a vehicle to "defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime. '43
The veil piercing doctrine is based on the recognition that rigid adher-
ence to shareholder limited liability will sometimes lead to unjust out-
39. See id. at 1549 ("In a large corporation, it is nearly impossible to identify a single individ-
ual or group of individuals responsible for a tort. For example, it would not be unusual for
hundreds of people to be involved in the design, production and marketing of a product. How-
ever, because LLCs tend to attract small, closely held enterprises run by their members, mem-
bers are at risk of being held personally liable under the collective torts doctrine. Such
enterprises tend to have small numbers of employees, and owners are often involved in opera-
tions. Responsibility, though diffuse, may still be confined enough to identify someone as a
central figure. An active LLC member may therefore find herself liable for the torts she helps
the LLC to commit.").
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1550.
43. Fox, supra note 8, at 1154 (quoting United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.,
142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).
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comes. 44 As a consequence of a piercing, courts will disregard the
corporation's limited liability and impose liability for corporate debts
on the corporate shareholders. 45
E. Applicability to LLC's
With little difficulty, courts and commentators have seen fit to apply
the first three common law exceptions (personal conduct, agency or
collective torts, and personal guarantees) directly to limited liability
companies. This smooth transition can be credited to the fact that the
principles behind the exceptions, as they apply to corporations, for the
most part apply equally to LLC's. Individuals will not be protected
from the consequences of their own misconduct, or those of their
agents, solely because they happen to be shareholders or LLC
members.
In comparison, the transition of the principles of piercing the corpo-
rate veil from the corporation to the LLC has been anything but
smooth. Commentators have raised a number of important issues and
areas of concern that call into question the merits behind directly ap-
plying the corporate piercing standards to LLC's. The debate is no
doubt complicated by the fact that despite years of litigation and com-
mentary, no clear standard has emerged for piercing the veil of corpo-
rations. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that the transition
of a vague, mysterious, unsettled doctrine to a new application, involv-
ing a variety of new principles and circumstances, would not constitute
a solid foundation upon which to build a clear, logical, principled stan-
dard to apply to LLC's.
Many of these issues will be summarized in the sections that follow.
First, however, this article will take a closer look at the general criteria
of the corporate piercing standard.
IV. FACTORS USED TO PIERCE THE VEIL OF CORPORATIONS
Despite many years of case law involving one of the most frequently
litigated issues in corporate law,46 no concrete, universal formula has
emerged under which a court must decide whether or not to pierce the
corporate veil and assign personal liability. 47 The classic test for pierc-
ing the corporate veil was promulgated by Fredrick J. Powell. The
44. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1154.
45. Id.
46. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.10, at 1-46
(3d ed. 1992), quoted in Bahls, supra note 9, at 61.
47. "[Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel] note that the doctrine is among
the most confusing in corporate law. Likewise, the Montana Supreme Court has noted that
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Powell test provides that courts should pierce the corporate veil and
impose personal liability when: (1) there is a unity of interest between
the corporation and its owners; (2) the corporation's actions are
wrongful or fraudulent; and (3) the corporation's creditors suffer an
unjust cost which warrants disregarding the corporate form.48
In addition to the Powell standard, certain factors have emerged
over time to aid courts in their piercing decision. 49 Four factors that
courts have consistently considered in making a piercing determina-
tion include: (1) fraud; (2) failure to adhere to corporate formalities;
(3) inadequate capitalization; and (4) abuse of the corporate entity so
as to amount to complete dominance by the shareholder or sharehold-
ers, commonly referred to as the "alter ego" or "instrumentality"
factor. 50
A. Fraud
One area of the piercing doctrine where courts have shown relative
consistency is with fraud. It is common for courts to pierce the limited
liability shield if the corporation has been used to perpetuate a fraud
or if a failure to pierce would promote injustice.51 As a piercing fac-
tor, fraud has been left generally undefined and unrestricted by the
courts; nevertheless, a few generalizations have been made.52 In fraud
cases involving contract claims, the following three representations
appear to be most common: (1) representations of the entity's finan-
cial status; (2) representations relating to the entity's performance;
and (3) representations that someone besides the entity will stand be-
hind the debt.53
B. Corporate Formalities
Another factor courts have commonly considered in corporate veil-
piercing cases is the failure to adhere to corporate formalities.5 4 In
'because the remedy is equitable, no concrete formula exists under which a court will disregard
the separate identity of the corporate entity."' Bahis, supra note 9, at 61.
48. See FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A
PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY § 3, at 4-6 (1931), quoted in
Debra Cohen-Whelan, Individual Responsibility in the Wake of Limited Liability, 32 U.S.F.L.
REV. 335, 347 (1998).
49. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1155.
50. See id.
51. See Huss, supra note 2, at 112.
52. See id. ("The types of actions or behaviors that constitute fraud are not generally defined
by the courts, although certain types of representations appear to arise frequently in piercing
cases involving contract claims.").
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 1162.
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determining whether to pierce the corporate veil, courts will fre-
quently look first at whether the corporation followed formalities and
kept sufficient records of the corporate activity. 55 Some examples of
formalities that courts regularly consider include the duties to: (1)
hold annual meetings; (2) elect directors and officers; (3) maintain
minutes and corporate records; and (4) issue stock certificates. 56 Sig-
nificant lapses in compliance with corporate formalities will weigh
against a shareholder maintaining his or her limited liability.5 7
More than any other factor in the corporate veil piercing analysis,
adherence to corporate formality has been under fire from critics who
question its appropriateness and value as a piercing consideration.58
One argument offered in favor of considering formalities is that re-
cord-keeping and related formalities assist in determining the conduct
of shareholders and the corporation at the time the cause of action
arose.59 Critics are quick to point out, however, that there is rarely a
direct connection between the misconduct (lack of corporate formal-
ity or record-keeping, for example), and the creditor's claim. 60 In ad-
dition, critics note that corporate formalities were designed and
implemented to protect shareholders from abuse, not to protect third
party creditors.61
Notwithstanding the merits of both sides of the issue, adherence to
corporate formality is generally considered insufficient grounds, in
and of itself, to justify a piercing. 62 Instead, it is more commonly cited
as a supporting factor for piercing a corporation.63 As explained by
David L. Cohen, "[o]ne possible reason is that evidence of the disre-
gard of formalities is usually sought long after the transaction giving
55. See Huss, supra note 2, at 112-13.
56. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1162.
57. See id. ("Failure to comply with corporate formalities usually will weigh against a share-
holder seeking to maintain his limited liability.").
58. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 1162 ("Scholars have criticized the use of the failure to
follow corporate formalities as a justification to pierce the veil. Unlike capitalization, corporate
formalities usually have no relation to the creditors' claims."); Huss, supra note 2, at 113 ("Crit-
ics say that it is inappropriate for courts to use this factor to pierce the veil in the corporate
context because there is no connection between the conduct (failure to keep records) and the
wrong leading to the piercing."); Chad Brigham, Just How Limited is the Illinois Limited Liabil-
ity Company? 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53, 75 (2001) (".... many scholars and commentators have criti-
cized this factor in holding shareholders personally liable for the debts of the corporation.").
59. See Huss, supra note 2, at 113.
60. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 1162-63; Huss, supra note 2, at 113.
61. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 172-76 (". . the corporate formalities relied upon by
courts to disregard limited liability are not intended to protect creditors in the first
place ... [Corporate procedures] are designed to protect shareholders from unfair treatment by
the directors or fellow owners.").
62. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 456; Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 358.
63. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 358.
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rise to the particular lawsuit took place, and a judgment based on ac-
tivities unrelated to the plaintiff's claim is seen as an unjustified
windfall.'64
C. Undercapitalization
Courts have also considered the undercapitalization of a corpora-
tion as an important element of their piercing analysis. Corporate
norms and social policy mandate that a corporation contribute enough
capital to its business to do a reasonably adequate job in covering its
potential liabilities.65 As Stephen B. Presser aptly noted:
The basic idea behind the [undercapitalization] theory is that if the
shareholder or shareholders deliberately incorporate with initial
capital they know to be inadequate to meet the expected liabilities
of the business they intend to be doing, they are engaging in an
abuse of the corporate form, and ought to be individually liable
when those liabilities actually occur.66
The amount of capital that is considered "adequate" for any given
corporation is dependent upon the nature of the corporate undertak-
ing,67 and "[i]f the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the busi-
ness to be done and the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the
separate entity privilege. '6
Proponents of the undercapitalization factor argue that it would be
inequitable to allow shareholders to deliberately or recklessly set up
flimsy organizations for the purpose of escaping liability.69 In addi-
tion, commentators assert that by imposing liability on shareholders,
investors will be discouraged from forming risky businesses unless or
until they can adequately capitalize or insure their business. 70 Critics
of undercapitalization argue that it should not be a factor in contract
cases, where a creditor has the opportunity to investigate the other
64. Cohen, supra note 5, at 456.
65. See Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1563.
66. Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting The Killing Of The Corporation: Limited Liability, Democ-
racy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 165 (1992).
67. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1157 ("Whether a corporation's capital is adequate is a factual
issue and depends largely on the nature of the business in comparison with the risk of loss or
liability. For example, a corporation formed with no assets to operate a swimming pool service
might be susceptible to veil piercing because that business carries an inherent risk of tort liabil-
ity. This factor is less important if the plaintiff is a contract creditor who has the capacity to
determine the corporation's capitalization before conducting business and can require share-
holder liability through individual guarantees.").
68. Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
69. Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1563. Schwindt also points out that "[t]he expectation of capi-
talization exists at the corporation's inception, and continues throughout the corporation's oper-
ation." Id.
70. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1158.
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party and/or contractually protect themselves. 71 Although most
courts agree that undercapitalization will weigh in favor of piercing
the corporate veil, there is substantial disagreement as to the weight
to be given this factor and whether or not it is sufficient cause to jus-
tify a piercing by itself.72
D. Alter Ego or Instrumentality
One final factor that is commonly considered in piercing cases tests
the degree to which the corporation is controlled by the owner or
owners. 73 This factor is referred to by various descriptive names, in-
cluding alter ego, instrumentality, disregard of separateness, etc. In
order to justify a piercing, courts require a threshold of similarity in
interest such that the corporation no longer has a personality separate
from its owners.74 In an effort to describe the standard, one court
noted that a corporation becomes an alter ego or mere instrumentality
of the individual "if the individual controls the corporation and con-
ducts its business affairs without due regard for the separate corporate
nature of the business; ... or if the corporate assets are dealt with by
the individual as if owned by the individual. .. 75
The underlying policies from which the alter ego doctrine was de-
rived seek to maintain a certain degree of separation of management
from ownership.76 These policies rationalize that while the passive in-
vestor, who has little influence over the actions of a corporation, is
justifiably protected from the debts of the corporation, the investor
who exerts total control over a corporation should in all fairness be
held responsible for the debts he incurs.77
In recent years, commentators have taken notice that the alter ego
standard affects some types of entities differently than others. As ex-
hibited by the empirical data of Robert Thompson, the alter ego doc-
trine has had a disproportionate impact on the close corporation.78
By definition, close corporations invite piercing since they are formed
71. See Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1564.
72. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1158.
73. See id. at 1163.
74. See id. at 1164.
75. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex. 1986).
76. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1166.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 1164; Thompson, supra note 6, at 9 ("Analysis of the hundreds of cases in which
piercing has occurred suggests the following results. Piercing occurs only in close corporations
or corporate groups; it does not occur in publicly held corporations... In an earlier empirical
study, I reported that among the 1600 reported cases of piercing the veil, there was no case in
which shareholders of a publicly held corporation were held liable. After additional analysis of
that data base, I can make a broader statement. Piercing occurs only within corporate groups or
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to conduct business on a more personal level than publicly traded cor-
porations.79 As one might surmise, the alter ego doctrine, with its fo-
cus on "control", is the major reason close corporations are the
primary focus of veil-piercing litigation.80
To a lesser degree, the risk of alter ego piercing also exists in a par-
ent corporation's relationship to a subsidiary.81 In the case of the par-
ent-subsidiary relationship, however, the risk of piercing can be more
naturally averted by taking measures to assure corporate formality
and respect for the separate entities. 82 In comparison, with close cor-
porations, the central reasons for forming a close corporation (gener-
ally ease and simplicity of corporate governance) encourage a
shareholder to run afoul of the standard courts use to justify a piercing
of the veil.
V. BRIEF HISTORY OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
As one of the more recent additions to the healthy assortment of
limited liability entities in the United States, the limited liability com-
pany ("LLC") has shown great promise as a choice of entity for to-
day's business enterprise. By offering the limited liability of a
corporation, combined with the pass-through tax treatment found in a
partnership, the LLC caused a minor business revolution. The LLC
became the fastest growing form of business entity. 3
Limited liability companies were officially introduced in the United
States in Wyoming in 1977, with Wyoming's passage of the first mod-
ern LLC act.84 The Wyoming LLC legislation was passed in an effort
to solve the limited liability/double taxation conundrum of the tradi-
tional corporation.85 Florida followed Wyoming's lead with LLC leg-
in close corporations with fewer than ten shareholders. None of the close corporations in which
piercing occurred had more than nine shareholders.").
79. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1164.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1164-65.
82. See id. at 1165-66 ("[T]he alter-ego doctrine may offer the strongest support for continued
use of the corporate-formalities factor. A sole shareholder who also serves as the sole operator
of a corporation often fails to follow formalities because the corporation essentially is used as an
individual proprietorship. This does not mean, however, that a concentration of ownership in a
close corporation is a sufficient reason to pierce the veil. A sole shareholder can enjoy limited
liability as long as the business is conducted on a corporate basis rather than on a personal basis
and there is adequate capitalization.").
83. See Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 163-67; see also Warren H. Johnson, Limited Liabil-
ity Companies (LLC): Is the LLC Liability Shield Holding Up Under Judicial Scrutiny?, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 177, 185 (2000) ("[tlhe number of LLC filings soared such that over 161,000 LLC's
were formed by the end of 1995").
84. See Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 163-64.
85. See id. at 163.
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islation in 1982. Following the adoption of Wyoming and Florida
statutes, however, very little was heard from the LLC for several
years.86 Uncertainty surrounding the IRS's view of the taxation of the
LLC impeded the LLC's growth in popularity.87
Then, in 1988, the IRS resolved much of the remaining concern
about the LLC by issuing IRS Revenue Ruling 88-76.88 The IRS de-
clared that the Wyoming LLC would be taxed as a partnership, with
its pass-through single layer of taxation, rather than the double-layer
of tax suffered by the corporation. 89 As a result, beginning in 1990
with Colorado and Kansas, the remaining states began enacting their
own LLC statutes.90 In 1996, Vermont and Hawaii became the final
two states to enact LLC statutes.91
Even with the issuance of Revenue Ruling 88-76 in 1988, LLC's
continued to be hampered by the risk of unfavorable corporate tax
treatment by the IRS.92 Until 1996, the IRS would decide whether to
impose a double tax on an LLC on the basis of the organizational
characteristics of the particular business.93 Under treasury regulations
adopted in 1960, the IRS used four attributes or characteristics to de-
termine whether a business would be treated as a partnership or cor-
poration for federal income tax purposes.94 Known as the Kintner
factors, these attributes were: (1) continuity of life; (2) centralized
management; (3) limited liability; and (4) free transferability of inter-
ests. 95 In order to avoid being treated as a corporation, and conse-
quently suffering a double layer of tax, an LLC could have no more
than two of the Kintner attributes. This four-factor corporate-charac-
teristic standard impeded the progress of LLC development. By un-
necessarily complicating the LLC formation process, the Kintner
factors inspired alternative forms of business entities and fueled the
adoption of new business entity organization laws that sought to limit
liability while avoiding double taxation.96
86. See Johnson, supra note 83, at 184-85 ("[I]t would take several years before the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) would warm up to the LLC concept of corporate-like characteristics with
partnership like taxation.").
87. See id.
88. See id. at 184.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 184-85.
91. Id. at 185.
92. See, e.g., Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 157-60 (discussing the tax treatment of LLC's
prior to the check-the-box regulations).
93. Id. at 158.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 158-59.
[Vol. 3:51
PIERCING THE VEIL OF LLC's
Fortunately, in 1996, the IRS issued final regulations designed to
simplify the tax rules by allowing taxpayers to treat unincorporated
business organizations, like the LLC, as a partnership or a corporation
on an elective "check the box" basis.97 This concession by the IRS
helped the LLC gain further momentum by adding to the list of ad-
vantages held by the LLC over other business entities.
VI. TREATMENT OF THE PIERCING ISSUE IN LLC STATUTES
Although certainly relevant to this discussion, state limited liability
company statutes contribute little in terms of guidance on the piercing
issue. In terms of providing limited liability, the LLC statutes are con-
sistent. All LLC statutes set forth the basic premise that LLC's are
independent entities that shield their members from personal liabil-
ity.98 In comparison, the LLC statutes are relatively scattered in terms
of treatment of the piercing issue. Generally, the states' statutory
treatment of the piercing issue can be broken down into three catego-
ries: (1) explicit treatment; (2) implicit treatment; and (3) no treat-
ment. In addition, some states have elected to provide for explicit
treatment of a particular piercing factor.
A. Explicit Treatment
Several states have chosen to explicitly adopt and apply the corpo-
rate concept of piercing the veil to their LLC's. For example, Minne-
sota's LLC statute provides that "case law that states the conditions
and circumstances under which the veil of a corporation may be
pierced under Minnesota law also applies to limited liability compa-
nies." 99 Similarly, the Colorado LLC statute states:
In any case in which a party seeks to hold the members of a limited
liability company personally responsible for the alleged improper
actions of the limited liability company, the court shall apply the
case law which interprets the conditions and circumstances under
which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Col-
orado law.1° °
Statutes like Colorado's and Minnesota's proscribe that the piercing
concept shall apply to LLC's and that courts should reference and ap-
ply existing corporate case law when making piercing decisions.
97. See generally Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66, 584 (Dec. 18,
1996); Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 169.
98. See Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1553.
99. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.303(2) (West 2001). For other similar state statutes, see
Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1553 n.55, (noting that Maine, North Dakota, Tennessee, Washing-
ton, and Wisconsin statutes contain similar treatment).
100. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-107(1) (West 2004).
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B. Implicit Treatment
Other states have opted for a more subtle approach, but have none-
theless achieved the same result. One such approach is to correlate
the liability of members to the liability shield enjoyed by shareholders.
For example, Maine's LLC statute provides that the exceptions to lim-
ited liability applicable to corporate shareholders also apply to mem-
bers of limited liability companies. 101 In addition, the Illinois statute
states: "[a] member of a limited liability company shall be personally
liable for any act, debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability
company or another member or manager to the extent that a share-
holder of an Illinois business corporation is liable in analogous cir-
cumstances under Illinois law. ' 102 As shown, these statutes make the
clear implication that an LLC member, much like a shareholder, can
be subjected to veil piercing and thereby exposed to personal liability.
C. No Treatment
The third category of state LLC statutes are silent on the issue of
piercing the veil. They neither explicitly nor implicitly broach the sub-
ject of piercing the veil of the LLC. Examples of state statutes which
are silent on the piercing issue include: Ohio, New York, North Caro-
lina and Kentucky.103 In the absence of legislative history on the sub-
ject, it is difficult to ascertain the true meaning of the omission.
Perhaps the most reasonable argument, however, is that these states
intended to defer to the courts to develop a common law doctrine for
LLC piercing in the same fashion as the corporate veil piercing stan-
dards were developed. 104
D. Special Treatment of Particular Piercing Factors
Some states have elected to combine references to the corporate
liability shield, while at the same time making particular reference to a
particular piercing factor. The California statute, for example, states
that LLC members will be held liable "under the same or similar cir-
cumstances and to the same extent as a shareholder of a corporation
may be personally liable.. .except that the failure to hold meetings of
members or managers or the failure to observe formalities pertaining
to the calling or conduct of meetings shall not be considered a factor
101. 31 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 645(3) (West 2004).
102. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/10-10(a) (West 2001).
103. See Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1554 n.60.
104. Id. at 1555.
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tending to establish... liability." 10 5 By adopting the corporate stan-
dards for piercing the veil, yet specifically eliminating the corporate
formality factor, California went further than any other state in pro-
viding guidance as to when piercing is appropriate.
10 6
VII. APPLICATION OF THE CORPORATE PIERCING FACTORS TO
THE LLC
From the enactment of the first LLC statute, the question of pierc-
ing has been an ongoing debate. The initial adoption of the corporate
standards for piercing the LLC veil was a logical choice considering
the fact that piercing is grounded in corporate principles and there is a
well-developed body of case law on corporate piercing. It would also
seem fair to conclude that the principles for piercing one limited liabil-
ity entity should be equally applicable and easily transferable to any
other limited liability entity. Unfortunately, as shown in the following
section, the factors used for piercing the veil of the corporation do not
translate well to the LLC.
A. Adherence to Formalities
From the early days of the LLC, commentators have overwhelm-
ingly agreed that application of the corporate formality standard to
LLC's is problematic at best.107 To start with, it bears mentioning that
the corporate formality standard is highly criticized even as a factor
for piercing the veil of corporations.108 In general, commentators
have challenged the relevance of corporate formality to the piercing
equation. For example, some argue that statutory corporate formali-
ties were intended to protect participants within the corporate enter-
prise from surprise decisions or actions without consultation.10 9
Protection of third party claimants was not one of the main underlying
concerns. While lack of formality claims are a popular challenge to
105. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West 2004); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.060
(West 2001).
106. See Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1555.
107. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 1172 ("Many commentators contend that the formalities
factor in corporate veil piercing is not appropriate for LLC veil piercing. In the corporate con-
text, the formalities factor is held in low esteem. Commentators are thus willing to disregard this
factor in the LLC context."); Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 176 ("The failure of these owners
to abide by sometimes expensive, often unproductive, formalities is not good evidence of misuse
of a limited-liability statute intended to encourage business."); Cohen, supra note 5, at 456-57;
Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1560-61.
108. See Brigham, supra note 58, at 74 n.131 ("Many commentators have expressed the same
concerns that formalities are too slender a reed to find shareholders, or members for that matter,
personally liable for company debts.") (citations omitted).
109. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 174.
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the corporate veil, the actual formality lapses are rarely relevant to a
plaintiff's injuries in a given case. 110 In addition, commentators have
noted the irony in the fact that the statutory formalities provided for
the owners' protection have evolved into the essential instrument used
to strip them of their limited liability. 111
Notably, several of the arguments used to support the corporate
formalities factor are inherently false. 112 For example, there is the ar-
gument that the LLC owner's failure to comply with statutory formali-
ties indicates the owner's lack of respect for the separateness of the
entity from the individual.113 According to Matheson and Eby, this
assumption is both false and irrelevant:
[I]n large part, this result occurs because the same [LLC's] are most
often the [small, closely held businesses] in which the owners are
most overworked, most likely to overlook formalities irrelevant to
their actual operation of the business, and least able to pay an attor-
ney to keep track of their formal statutory obligations. The failure
of these owners to abide by sometimes expensive, often unproduc-
tive, formalities is not good evidence of misuse of a limited liability
statute intended to encourage business.' 14
Another problem with the adherence to formality factor involves a
distinguishing characteristic of LLC's.115 In stark contrast to corpora-
tions, LLC's have relatively few statutorily mandated formalities and
have a considerable amount of freedom and flexibility as to the man-
agement structure of the entity.1 6 As one commentator pointed out:
"LLC members, by the nature of the entity, will be inclined to organ-
ize and run LLC's in a very informal manner... Thus, to allow pierc-
ing for disregarding LLC formalities. . .will make the promise of
limited liability for LLC's empty by definition. 11 7 Moreover, strict
application of the formalities test could lead to the imposition of addi-
tional common law requirements to operate with corporate-like for-
mality. 118 This result would be in direct conflict with the legislative
110. Id. at 174-75.
111. See id. at 175 ("Indeed, it is strange that statutory protections for owners have evolved
into an essential instrument used for stripping them of their statutory limited liability.").
112. See, e.g., Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 175-77.
113. Id. at 175.
114. Id. at 176.
115. See Huss, supra note 2, at 112-13.
116. See id. at 113.
117. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 456-57.
118. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 358 ("Statutorily, LLCs need not observe most
corporate formalities. Thus, judicial application of the.. .formalities test could impose additional
common law requirements to operate with corporate-like formality... Judicial modification of
the formalities requirement could allow veil piercing when LLC members fail to follow the statu-
tory requirements specifically applicable to LLCs. State statues require LLCs to maintain ade-
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intent of LLC statutes.. .not to burden the entity with heavy formality
requirements. 19 In recognition of this possibility, several states were
prompted to eliminate the formalities test in their LLC statutes.
120
Lastly, it should be noted that a number of commentators have sug-
gested that courts should not consider whether normal corporate for-
malities have been met by the LLC, but instead should examine
whether members disregard LLC formalities.12' While this is perhaps
a more relevant standard, the reality is that application of such a stan-
dard would not be an effective gauge of improper LLC conduct. With
very few formalities actually mandated by LLC statutes, LLC mem-
bers are less likely to run afoul of the rules and cases involving an
actual lapse will be few and far between.122 The factor would then
become more of a hidden pitfall than a credible evaluation of the con-
duct of the LLC members. As such, the importance of the factor
would gradually diminish. As one commentator pointed out, "[I]n the
absence of statutory formalities, courts have likely lost an often cited
argument for piercing the veil. ' '12 3
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the use of formalities as a factor for
piercing LLC's has been rejected in both case law and statutes.12 4 For
all the reasons cited above, lack of formality should be universally re-
jected as a factor in LLC piercing cases. Any consideration of this
factor by courts in LLC piercing cases would simply act as a distrac-
tion from more important elements such as fraud, wrongdoing, and
injustice.
quate books and records and an agent for service of process. If company members ignore the
formalities imposed by their own operating agreement (e.g. not holding a required periodic
meeting), then a failure to follow company formalities may be found. Courts using a formalities
test based on the applicable state LLC law may trap unwary companies that function under the
sole proprietorship/partnership model and fail to follow formal administrative procedures.").
119. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1172 ("State legislatures...intended not to burden LLC's with
heavy formality requirements."); see also Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey R. McCool, The Wyoming
Limited Liability Company: A Viable Alternative to the S Corporation and the Limited Partner-
ship?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523, 532 (1988) (stating that "rigid adherence to corporate
formalities is not applicable because the LLC has statutorily dispensed with requirements for
such formalities") and Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the
Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 378, 446 (1992) (noting that the Wyoming statute requires only a
few formalities and concluding that few veil-piercing cases would result).
120. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 358.
121. See Bahls, supra note 9, at 63; see also Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 358.
122. See Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1561.
123. See id.; see also Shaun M. Klein, Piercing the Veil of the Limited Liability Company, From
Sure Bet to Long Shot: Gallinger v. North Star Hospital Mutual Assurance, Ltd, 22 J. CORP. L.
131, 138 (1996).
124. See Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 176.
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B. Alter Ego or Instrumentality
Much like the adherence to formality factor, the "alter ego" or "in-
strumentality" factor appears to be tailored more for the corporation
than the LLC. Again, the problem involves a distinction between cor-
porations and LLC's. The alter ego factor was designed to test corpo-
rations for appropriate separateness between management and
ownership. 125 As stated previously, this factor was based on the long-
standing principle that legitimate corporations must have an appropri-
ate degree of separateness. 126 If a corporation fails this test, then a
piercing of the corporate veil is warranted to prevent abusive uses of
the corporate entity, fraud or injustices.
Unlike corporation statutes, sections of the LLC statutes explicitly
support flexibility in the LLC management structure. 127 Some LLC
statutes specifically provide for member-management as the default
rule, while others make centralized, or manager-managed structure
the default.128 Either way, the statutes allow the LLC to simply opt
out of the default structure for a more preferable management
structure. 129
Notwithstanding the various statutory schemes, LLC's are more
often than not managed by the LLC members. 130 In addition, gener-
ally speaking, members are normally authorized agents and/or manag-
ers of LLC's for the purpose of conducting its affairs.' 31 As such, it
could be argued that the alter ego factor is usually satisfied for
LLC's.132 As one commentator noted, given the statutory authoriza-
tion of flexible LLC management structures, domination of LLC man-
agement by members of the LLC, absent other equitable issues, would
appear to be an "inappropriate" factor for the courts to use to pierce
the veil to the detriment of the interest holders. 133
125. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1166.
126. See id. at 1163-66.
127. See Huss, supra note 2, at 115.
128. Id. at 115-16.
129. Fox, supra note 8, at 1150-51 ("Another aspect common to most LLC statutes is flexible
management. Most statutes contemplate participation in management by all members. The
members can agree, however, to a centralized management format at the formation of the
LLC.").
130. See generally Bahls, supra note 9, at 62-63.
131. See id.
132. Id.; see also Stone v. Frederick Hobby Assoc. II, No. CV000181620S, 2001 WL 861822
(Conn. Super. July 10, 2001).
133. Huss, supra note 2, at 116.
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Thus, application of the alter ego factor to LLC's will often lead to
"illogical" results. 134 By following the letter of the law under the lim-
ited liability company statute, you can be left susceptible to personal
liability due to a piercing of the LLC's veil. In Illinois, for example,
the default rule is that the LLC will be member-managed. 135 The sig-
nificance of this is that the majority of LLC's will be operated by their
owners, and will therefore be highly susceptible to piercing based on
lack of separateness. 136 If this position is adopted indefinitely by the
courts and/or lawmakers, this would have a disastrous chilling effect
on LLC formation. 137
In fact, under the alter ego standard, LLC's may be even more sus-
ceptible to piercing than closely held corporations. 138 Corporations
are held somewhat in check by the statutory organization and proce-
dural requirements such as shareholder meetings, minutes, annual re-
ports, etc.139 LLC statutes, however, require very few formalities;
some states permit LLC's to be formed and run without keeping any
records whatsoever.' 40
In his article, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies, Eric
Fox suggests that the alter ego factor should be applied to centrally
managed LLC's but not to member-managed LLC's.141 Fox states
that: "[t]he applicability of [the alter ego] factor to LLC's depends
largely on the decisions that members make with respect to manage-
ment alternatives... If the LLC is operated under a centralized man-
agement scheme, the separate-entity factor should be given significant
consideration."' 142 Yet, with regard to member-managed LLC's, "leg-
islatures likely did not intend for member management to infringe on
an LLC's ability to maintain limited liability. Therefore, domination
of an LLC by its members should not be given significant weight in
LLC veil-piercing cases."'1 43 This "double" standard for LLC's, how-
134. See Brigham, supra note 58, at 76 ("[T]here is a strong argument that this member or
shareholder dominance prong of the analysis is illogical when applied to LLCs. This is due to
the fact that in Illinois, by statute, the default rule is that the LLC will be member-managed. The
significance of this is that the majority of LLCs will be operated by their owners. Thus, by its




137. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 355.
138. See Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1562.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Fox, supra note 8, at 1172-73.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1174.
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ever, would lead to unacceptable results if carried through to its natu-
ral conclusion. If centrally-managed LLC's were susceptible to alter
ego piercings while member-managed LLC's were exempt, astute bus-
iness planners would soon rule out any consideration of the centrally-
managed LLC as a management structure, for fear of susceptibility to
a piercing. This result is contrary to the letter and spirit of the LLC
statutes, which explicitly endorse flexibility and freedom of choice in
organizing the management structure of an LLC.
C. Undercapitalization
Unlike the corporate formality factor and alter ego factor, under-
capitalization appears to be directly applicable to LLC's with little or
no modification. Importantly, the arguments in support of the under-
capitalization factor are as applicable to LLC's as they are to corpora-
tions. For example, supporters of the factor argue that flimsy
organizations established to escape personal liability should not be
tolerated in either the corporate or LLC setting.144 In addition, com-
mentators assert that undercapitalized firms are more likely to engage
in unacceptably risky activities. 145 In the absence of an effective check
on the capitalization of firms, they argue that owners will be increas-
ingly willing to engage in risky activities because they have little to
lose.1 4
6
Yet undercapitalization has its own set of shortcomings as a piercing
factor. First and foremost, raising a barrier in the form of a high stan-
dard of capitalization runs the risk of discouraging small business de-
velopment, which is a major concern for obvious economic reasons.
Small business is a vital source of employment, growth, and develop-
ment in our economy. Therefore, creating such a barrier to small bus-
iness development should not be contemplated without first
establishing that the measure is good public policy. This is especially
true when one considers that legislatures have repeatedly created new
forms of limited liability entities in part to stimulate investment and
growth in small business. As Matheson and Eby point out,
"[d]epriving small business owners of their limited liability protection
because of their indebtedness runs counter to the purpose of limited
liability."147
Supplying a business perspective, Matheson and Eby raise three im-
portant points that show how the undercapitalization standard can be
144. Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1563.
145. Bahis, supra note 9, at 66.
146. Id.
147. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 177.
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problematic: first, holding a corporation owner liable because the cor-
poration incurs debt in excess of its assets fails to recognize that most
businesses, at least initially, are highly leveraged.148 Outside of the
wealthy investor, it is hard to imagine how the modern startup busi-
ness could be "adequately" capitalized. 149 Second, as stated previ-
ously, minimum-capitalization requirements will operate as a bar to
new entrants into the market.1 50 Considering the importance of small
business development to our economy, the high cost of such barriers
must be stressed. Such barriers are also contrary to the intent of the
legislature, as seen in the LLC statutes. 151 Finally, from a purely busi-
ness-minded perspective, it does not make financial sense to put more
capital than necessary into the operation of a modern business. 152
Stockpiling of this sort leads to smaller return on equity and a less
successful investment. 153
Another major problem with undercapitalization is the difficulty in
developing a workable standard that can be meaningfully and fairly
applied to all shapes and sizes of businesses.154 One challenge for
courts in the corporate veil-piercing arena has been to determine what
level of capitalization is sufficient, given the widely divergent needs of
businesses and the elusiveness of a standard for gauging the level of
risk a particular business proprietor should be willing to accept. 55 Al-
though various theoretical tests for inadequate capitalization have
been tossed around, it is unlikely that one test will be able to account
for all the different sizes and types of business and the expected and
unexpected tort liabilities that are attributable to each particular area
of business.' 56
Finally, it is important to note that undercapitalization has rarely
been found to be sufficient by itself to pierce the veil. 157 In the con-




151. Id. at 177-78 ("The repeal of statutory minimum-capitalization requirements for corpora-
tions, along with the absence of minimum-capitalization requirements in the modern [LLC] stat-
utes, is strong evidence against inferring a minimum capitalization requirement for [ LLC's I).
152. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 178.
153. Id.
154. Huss, supra note 2, at 114-15.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1162.
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tional factors to pierce the veil. 158 Courts apparently have concluded
that the policy rationale behind the undercapitalization factor is not
strong enough to justify a corporate veil piercing without supporting
factors.159 In light of this fact, the applicability of the other piercing
factors becomes significant.
The problems surrounding undercapitalization are enhanced by the
fact that the other two main piercing factors (adherence to formalities
and alter ego) have serious questions surrounding their applicability
to LLC's. Therefore, if the lack of formalities factor and alter ego
factor are unavailable to support the piercing of an undercapitalized
entity, in the absence of fraud, the entity will not be subject to a pierc-
ing. 160 Consequently, when one considers the current state of each of
the separate factors, and their interaction as one comprehensive sys-
tem, the impression you get is that the common law piercing system as
it applies to LLC's is patently dysfunctional.
D. Fraud
Unlike the previous three factors, fraud is a factor that is equally
applicable to LLC's.161 It helps that the policy considerations for
preventing fraud in the corporate context apply equally to LLC's.1 62
It is in the public interest to disregard the legal fiction of a separate
entity, whether that be a corporation or LLC, when those benefiting
from that fiction commit fraudulent conduct. 163 Fraud, however, does
not encompass the entire spectrum of conduct that warrants a piercing
of the LLC veil in the interest of equity. 164 For example, fraud is more
often found where there is a pre-existing relationship between the
creditor and the business entity, making fraud more significant for vol-
untary as opposed to involuntary creditors.1 65 The bigger problem for
courts and legislators has been how to handle the non-fraudulent
cases, such as with an involuntary creditor. This issue will be explored
in the following sections.
158. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1171, 1174-75 ("[i]f inadequate capitalization is the only factor
present in a corporate veil-piercing case, the majority of courts would hold, absent some addi-
tional evidence of disrespect for the corporate entity, that the veil should not be pierced").
159. See id. at 1175.
160. See id.
161. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 356.
162. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1169.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1169-1170.
165. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 356.
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VIII. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM EXISTING
CASE LAW?
With a handful of early LLC piercing cases from which to draw, this
article will briefly survey the landscape of existing case law and at-
tempt to identify common themes and important lessons. For pur-
poses of this article, fourteen cases were selected and scrutinized
based on the fact that in each case, to some extent, the court reached
the merits of the LLC piercing claim.1 66 Several important lessons can
be gathered from these cases.
First, it is apparent that the courts have applied the traditional cor-
porate standards for piercing the veil with little mention of the fact
that the standards are being applied to an entirely different form of
entity.1 67 In fact, without looking closely, you would think the courts
are simply analyzing the piercing of a corporation. 168 The cases con-
tain no analysis of the distinctions between corporations and limited
liability companies. Although a number of the courts cite support for
the applicability of the corporate piercing standards to LLC's, 69 they
seem to assume a wholesale application and provide little, if any, anal-
ysis as to how the corporate standards are to be applied.
To its credit, the Supreme Court of Wyoming recently noted in an
LLC piercing case that there are some distinctions between corpora-
tions and LLC's that must be taken into consideration. In Kaycee
Land and Livestock v. Flahive, a decision rendered May 15, 2002, the
Court commented: "[c]ertainly, the various factors which would jus-
166. See generally, Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323 (Wyo. 2002); Nettech
Solutions LLC v. Zippark.com, No. 01 CIV. 2683(SAS), 2001 WL 1111966 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,
2001); KLM Indus. v. Tylutki, No. CV980062008S, 2001 WL 1098069 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 23,
2001); Great Neck Plaza v. Le Peep Rest., 37 P.3d 485 (Colo. App. 2001); Stone v. Frederick
Hobby Assoc. II, No. CV000181620S, 2001 WL 861822 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2001);
Litchfield Asset Mgmt. v. Howell, No. CV980076827, 2000 WL 1785122 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov.
14, 2000); Hamilton v. AAI Ventures, 768 So.2d 298 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Hollowell v. Orleans
Reg. Hosp., 217 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2000); Trustees of Village of Arden v. Unity Constr. Co., No.
C.A. 15025, 2000 WL 130627 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2000); Tom Thumb Food Markets, Inc. v. TLH
Prop., No. C9-98-1277, 1999 WL 31168 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1999); In re Webster. 212 B.R.
1006 (Fla. Bankr. 1997); Ditty v. Checkrite Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Utah 1997); Gallinger v.
North Star Hosp. Mut. Assur. Ltd., 64 F.3d 422 (8th Cir. 1995).
167. See generally, supra note 166.
168. See, e.g. Gallinger, 64 F.3d at 424, and 427, (referring to the LLC as a "corporate entity,"
that was "incorporated in Bermuda", and seemingly disregarding the fact that the entity in ques-
tion is an LLC).
169. See, e.g. Hollowell, 217 F.3d at 385, n. 7 (stating that "[t]he district court concluded that
for alter ego purposes, Louisiana would treat an LLC in the same manner as a corporation");
Litchfield Asset Mgmt, 2000 WL at *1 (noting that "[t]he same theory applies in the case of a
limited liability company"); Ditty, 973 F.Supp. at 1335 (finding that "most commentators assume
that the doctrine [of piercing ] applies to limited liability companies").
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tify piercing an LLC veil would not be identical to the corporate situa-
tion for the obvious reason that many of the organizational formalities
applicable to corporations do not apply to LLC's.' 170 Unfortunately,
due to an incomplete record, the Court passed on the opportunity to
spell out which of the possible factors would be applied to LLC's in
Wyoming in the future, finding it "inadvisable" in this case.171 De-
spite the Court's decision to cut its analysis short, the Court did seem-
ingly open the door to future analysis of the issue of the piercing
factors applicable to LLC's. Of all the cases reviewed and cited in this
article, this case offered the most hope that courts will be willing to
substantively analyze the appropriateness of the piercing standards as
applied to LLC's.
In defense of the courts, until recently there has been very little
authority in the form of case law or commentary that would support
any analysis other than the corporate common law. Thus, courts have
had no other choice but to attempt to make the corporate standard
"fit" an application to LLC's.
In addition to the courts' deference to the corporate common law, a
review of the existing LLC piercing cases shows that courts have be-
come increasingly reliant on the Alter Ego or Instrumentality doc-
trine.172 In fact, it has become a rare occasion for a court to address
an LLC piercing challenge without application of the alter ego fac-
tor.173 Starting with the early LLC piercing cases,174 the trend has
continued and can be found in the most recent LLC piercing cases. In
Nettech Solutions LLC v. Zippark.com, decided September 20, 2001,
the court set forth the New York standard, stating: "the corporate veil
may be pierced if a corporation is essentially an alter ego of a family
or individual."' 175 The Nettech court then explained that "[i]n order to
pierce the corporate veil on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff
must show (1) the complete domination of the corporation with re-
170. Kaycee Land and Livestock, 46 P.3d at 328.
171. See id.
172. See generally, Kaycee Land and Livestock, 46 P.3d 323; Nettech Solutions LLC, 2001 WL
1111966; KLM Indus., 2001 WL 1098069; Great Neck Plaza, 37 P.3d 485; Stone, 2001 WL 861822;
Litchfield Asset Mgmt, 2000 WL 1785122.; Hamilton, 768 So. 2d 298; Hollowell, 217 F.3d 379;
Trustees of Village of Arden, 2000 WL 130627; Tom Thumb Food Markets, Inc., 1999 WL 31168;
In Re Multimedia Communications Group, 212 B.R. 1006.; Ditty, 973 F. Supp 1320; Gallinger, 64
F.3d 422; all of which cite the alter ego/instrumentality / separateness standard as controlling.
173. As shown by the aforementioned cases, supra note 167, where the court actually reaches
the merits of the piercing issue, the alter ego / instrumentality factor is the central factor in
almost every case.
174. See, e.g., In re Multimedia Communications Group, 212 B.R. at 1010; Ditty, 973 F.Supp.
at 1335-1337.
175. Nettech Solutions LLC, 2001 WL at *11.
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spect to the transaction at issue, and (2) that such domination was
used to commit a fraud or wrong against the aggrieved party."1 76 In
Nettech, the court denied a motion to dismiss a piercing claim based
on facts showing the LLC member exercised complete control over
the subject LLC, the LLC had no employees, the LLC was involved in
no business other than that derived from the arrangement with the
plaintiff, and all of the plaintiff's dealings with the LLC were con-
ducted through the LLC member. 177
In Great Neck Plaza v. Le Peep Restaurants, LLC, a Colorado
Court of Appeals case decided August 16, 2001, the court applied the
alter ego factor in similar fashion, finding that "[t]he corporate entity
may be disregarded, and [the] corporate veil may be pierced, if not
doing so would defeat public convenience, justify wrong, or protect
fraud. Specifically, the veil may be pierced where the subsidiary is
merely an alter ego of the principal. 1 78 The court then listed ten spe-
cific factors upon which it would base its decision to pierce the LLC
veil under the alter ego doctrine. 179 Upon doing so, the court found
sufficient evidence to support a piercing of the LLC veil, basing its
decision on the following: (1) evidence that the individual was presi-
dent or manager of two judgment debtors and also of the LLC and the
holding company; (2) that the individual financed the debtors; (3) that
assets were moved "gymnastically" between the debtors, the LLC,
and the holding company; (4) that before this garnishment proceed-
ing, no entity besides one debtor was entitled to the profits and in-
come of the LLC; and (4) that at time of this garnishment proceeding,
the individual owned all the stock of, and served as president of, the
holding company that owned the debtors and the LLC.180 As shown
by these cited facts, Great Neck Plaza appears somewhat distinguisha-
ble from Nettech in that the LLC member in Great Neck Plaza was
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Great Neck Plaza, 37 P.3d at 490.
179. Id. (Listing the following factors: "(1) The parent corporation owns all or a majority of
the capital stock of the subsidiary. (2) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common
directors or officers. (3) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary. (4) The parent corpora-
tion subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation. (5)
The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital. (6) The parent corporation pays the salaries or
expenses or losses of the subsidiary. (7) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with
the parent corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation. (8) In
the papers of the parent corporation, and in the statements of its officers, 'the subsidiary' is
referred to as such or as a department or division. (9) The directors or executives of the subsidi-
ary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take direction from the parent
corporation. (10) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate and independent
corporation are not observed").
180. Id. at 490.
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guilty of more wrongful conduct, including suspicious movement of
assets and illicit distribution of LLC funds. Whereas, in Nettech, the
court relied more on evidence of control and lack of separateness of
the LLC from its owner.
The pattern of judicial reliance on the alter ego doctrine was also
exhibited in Stone v. Frederick Hobby Associates II, a Connecticut
case decided July 10, 2001.181 In Stone, the court does an effective job
of breaking down the Connecticut standard for piercing the corporate
veil. The court explained that the Connecticut standard, a variation of
the alter ego doctrine, is bifurcated into two separate rules:
"[p]iercing the corporate veil, or alternately the alter ego theory, may
be proven through the instrumentality rule or the identity rule.' 18 2
The instrumentality rule, as the court explains, requires proof of three
elements:
(1) [c]ontrol, not mere majority or complete stock control, but com-
plete domination, not only of finances but of policy and busi-
ness practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no sepa-
rate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) that such control
must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or
wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other posi-
tive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of
plaintiff's legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and
breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of.1 8 3
The identity rule is applicable to situations where "two corporations
or companies are, in reality, controlled as one entity because of com-
mon owners, officers, directors, members or shareholders, and be-
cause of a lack of observance of corporate or company formalities
between the two entities. ' 184 In upholding the plaintiff's motion for
prejudgment attachment, the court found probable cause to support a
veil piercing under both the instrumentality rule and the identity
rule. 185 Similar application of the Connecticut piercing standard is ex-
hibited in two other recent cases, both of which were decided under
the alter ego doctrine. 8 6
As demonstrated by these three examples, as well as the other cases
cited, courts facing the issue of piercing an LLC veil have become
increasingly dependent upon the alter ego doctrine. This practice is
181. See Stone, 2001 WL at *1.
182. Id. at *8.
183. Id.
184. Id. at *9.
185. Id. at *10-11.
186. See generally, KLM Indus., 2001 WL at *5; Litchfield Asset Mgmt., 2000 WL at *4-5.
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most likely the result of the decreased utility of the corporate formali-
ties factor and the complexity involved in applying the undercapital-
ization factor.
Another noticeable theme from the cases is that the amount of con-
trol possessed and wielded by the LLC owner has played a major role
in determining when the LLC veil will be pierced. 187 This result ap-
pears to be a natural derivative of the court's constant application of
the alter ego doctrine, which normally enlists control as a determining
factor. Although the circumstances and terminology used by each
court varied somewhat, the message remained the same... if the LLC
owner exercised too much control over the business, they became vul-
nerable to a piercing.
The following cases demonstrate the kind of control cited by the
courts as grounds for piercing: Nettech Solutions, LLC v. Zip-
Park.com, ("[t]he facts suggested that [the LLC member] exercised
complete dominion and control over all matters concerning [the
LLC]", "[f]urthermore, all of NetTech's dealings with [the LLC] were
through [the LLC member]") 188; Great Neck Plaza v. Le Peep Restau-
rants, LLC, (control shown by evidence that "individual was president
or manager of two judgment debtors and also of limited liability com-
pany and holding company," and "individual owned all stock of, and
served as president of, holding company that owned debtors and
LLC") 18 9; KLM Industries, Inc. v. Tylutki (complete control exercised
over the management, finances, hiring, and policies of the [LLC]) 190;
Stone v. Frederick Hobby Associates II, (the LLC members exercised
"such domination over [the LLC] that in essence, the limited liability
company had no mind, will or existence of its own") 191; Hollowell v.
Orleans Regional Hospital LLC, (dominion and control over the LLC
shown by the fact that the individuals held themselves out as the own-
ers and directors of the LLC, they indeed controlled the decisions of
the LLC, and they had the ability to receive a $1.5 million distribution
on the eve of [the LLC] shutdown) 92; Litchfield Asset Management v.
Howell, (the defendant exercised near complete control in the forma-
187. See generally, Nettech Solutions LLC; 2001 WL 1111966; Great Neck Plaza, 37 P.3d 485;
KLM Indus., 2001 WL 1098069.; Stone, 2001 WL 861822; Hollowell, 217 F.3d 379; Litchfield
Asset Mgmt., 2000 WL 1785122.
188. NetTech Solutions LLC, 2001 WL at *11.
189. Great Neck Plaza, 37 P.3d at 490.
190. KLM Indus., 2001 WL at *5.
191. Stone, 2001 WL at *10.
192. See Hollowell, 217 F.3d at 387.
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tion of the companies, the finances, policy and business practices of
the companies) 193.
These cases demonstrate the current dilemma faced by LLC mem-
bers and business planners. On the one hand, the state LLC statutes
expressly authorize informal management structures with concentra-
tions of power and control in one or more of the members. With
many small business owners weary of the burden of corporate formali-
ties and the cumbersome nature of formal corporate management
structures, the flexibility offered by the LLC statutes has been a
strong selling point. Yet, on the other hand, the judiciary appears
ready, willing and able to pierce the veil of such LLC arrangements
and find the members personally liable for the debts of the company.
As shown, there are a several important themes that can be drawn
from the existing case law. First, in the absence of better guidance
from courts and commentators, courts will continue to apply the cor-
porate standards for piercing the veil to LLC's as if they were piercing
a corporation. In doing so, the courts appear to be perfectly willing to
gloss over the fact that they are applying the corporate standards to an
entirely different form of entity. Considering the problems with ap-
plying the corporate standards to the LLC, as shown above in Section
VII, this practice will gradually have a negative impact on LLC's, cre-
ating an air of uncertainty as to the limited liability of the entity, and
coming in direct conflict with the policy considerations supporting the
LLC.
Next, it is clear that courts have become increasingly dependent on
the alter ego doctrine in LLC piercing cases. While the alter ego doc-
trine does provide a standard that is somewhat applicable to LLC's,
the standard allows courts to unfairly target LLC's and small busi-
nesses and often fails to identify the wrongful conduct that justifies an
equitable remedy.
Similarly, the focus on the "control" of the LLC member will make
most one and two member LLC's vulnerable to attack. This problem
was observed by the court in Stone v. Frederick Hobby Assoc. II: "the
first element of complete control is certainly present, as would be the
case for most limited liability companies having only two members
who are also the only two owners and managers."'1 94 The disparate
impact on LLC's caused by the "control" factor is indicative of the
problems that have resulted from applying the traditional corporate
standards to an entirely different entity.
193. Litchfield Asset Mgmt., 2000 WL at *4.
194. Stone, 2001 WL at *10.
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Application of the control factor also results in an unmistakable
clash of policies. The courts' scrutiny of "control" comes in direct
conflict with several of the underlying policies of the LLC (such as
flexibility of management structure) that were previously approved by
the state legislatures in enacting the LLC statutes. If left uncorrected,
the courts' constant scrutiny of control will eventually discourage LLC
members from taking advantage of the freedom of management struc-
ture expressly provided by the LLC statutes.
IX. THE NEED FOR A NEW STANDARD
To date, the courts have refused to stray very far from the tradi-
tional principles of corporate common law in analyzing claims to
pierce the veil of LLC's. With the exception of the adherence to cor-
porate formalities factor, courts have generally remained true to the
corporate veil piercing standards. This "loyalty" to the traditional
standards is unfortunate considering the tremendous advancements
that have taken place in business law since the unveiling of the LLC.
Tax and business planners have been wise to take notes in pencil con-
sidering the constant progression of changes. With that in mind, it
seems foolish, even apathetic, to fail to take a hard look at the veil
piercing standards. Considering the many distinguishing factors that
have set LLC's apart from other business entities, and the work that
has gone into their initial adoption and subsequent fine tuning, it is
clear that the stage has been set. The time is now right to contemplate
the adoption of a new standard that is specially designed and narrowly
tailored to the specific traits and underlying policies of the LLC.
A. Shortcomings of the Corporate Standards
To understand the need for a new standard for piercing LLC's, one
needs to look no further than the existing corporate standards. De-
spite many years of case law and commentary, our courts have failed
to develop and substantially agree upon a meaningful, well-defined
standard for piercing the veil of corporations. The rules and ratio-
nales for veil piercing have been called "vague and illusory", 195 and
the actual judicial application of the standards has been analogized to
"lightning" *** rare, severe and unprincipled". 196 Despite being one
of the most litigated issues in corporate law, piercing the corporate
195. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 89, 89 (1985); Huss, supra note 2, at 109.
196. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 195, at 89.
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veil remains one of the most misunderstood.' 97 The nature of the
problem has been summarized as follows:
The question of whether to apply the doctrine of piercing the veil[to LLC's] in the same manner as it is applied to corporations is
complicated by the lack of uniformity in the application of the the-
ory to corporations themselves. A description of the various "rules"
relating to the doctrine of piercing the veil is difficult to define be-
cause of the seemingly random manner in which courts have applied
the doctrine. *** [There] is no consensus among commentators
and the courts as to which situations the doctrine should be
applied. 198
Due to the level of uncertainty and disagreement, the common law
has not evolved to the point where one workable standard has
emerged. Instead, the piercing doctrine has been obscured to the
point where it is now "lost in a fog." 199 In the midst of that fog, courts
have been faced with making difficult piercing decisions with very lit-
tle guidance, sometimes resulting in the court "subjecting business
owners to potentially ruinous liabilities because the corporation did
not observe irrelevant procedures enacted only to protect sharehold-
ers or because owners exercised control over corporations commensu-
rate with their ownership interest. '200
Therefore, if in fact the common law standard for piercing the cor-
porate veil is in such disarray, the obvious question is why should we
be so determined to apply this mess to LLC's? As one commentator
put it, "[the] desultory state of the common law would itself be reason
enough for clarification or reform. 201 Despite all the radical ad-
vancements made by the LLC, there is not a great deal of controversy
surrounding the entity. Application of the "vague" and "unsettled"
corporate piercing standards will effectively import the same frustra-
tions to the LLC. To apply the corporate common law standards to
the LLC is the equivalent of knowingly installing a defective auto part
in a brand new car. The corporate standards have not worked well in
the context of corporations, and they will work even less effectively
when applied to LLC's.
197. Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1556; (adding that "[j]udicial opinions are 'long on rhetoric
and short on reasoning,' using such catch words as 'alter ego,' 'instrumentality,' and 'screen,'
followed by little substantive explanation. In addition, courts often fail to distinguish between
tort and contract cases despite their requiring obviously different policy considerations. The
result is a confusing class of case law that is difficult to apply.") (citations omitted).
198. Huss, supra note 2, at 109.
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B. The Need for Vagueness?
One potential barrier to the development of a new standard is the
belief that to be effective, piercing law must remain vague.20 2 This
school of thought was derived from the equitable principle that the
corporate form should be ignored in cases where the corporation has
been used to perpetuate a wrong or injustice. 20 3 As the thinking goes,
in order to insure that the court can provide a remedy for injured
parties, piercing law must be kept vague because if made clear, people
intent on committing injustices could merely factor their actions
around the law.20 4 While the concerns of intentional circumvention of
the law are valid and warrant consideration, perhaps the better solu-
tion is flexibility in a standard as opposed to vagueness. With the
proper amount of flexibility, judges will have the ability to reach any
wrong or injustice. If that flexibility is combined with clear standards,
judges will have more guidance on how to apply the law and LLC
members will have a better idea of how to lawfully steer clear of a
piercing.
C. LLC's are Unique
One of the most obvious, yet most important, justifications for cre-
ating a new standard for piercing LLC's is that LLC's are significantly
different from corporations. In fact, it is many of these differences
which have made the LLC one of the fastest growing forms of busi-
ness entities. As one court noted,
[t]he allure of the limited liability company is its unique ability to
bring together in a single business organization the best features of
all other business forms - properly structured, its owners obtain
both a corporate-styled liability shield and the pass-through tax ben-
efits of a partnership.205
For example, LLC's generally differ from corporations in terms of
lack of corporate formalities, decentralized management structure,
and partnership pass-through taxation. By combining the best of the
corporate and partnership features, LLC's quickly became the entity
of choice in the eyes of most business planners. It is also this multi-
faceted quality, however, that has led to many of the difficulties in the
202. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 445, citing I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of a Corpo-
rate Entity, 12 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 517 (1912); Presser, supra note 8, at 1-32.
203. See Wormser, supra note 202, at 517, (cited in Cohen, supra note 5, at 445)(Wormser was
the first person to popularize the term "piercing the veil," believing that the corporate form
should be ignored only when a corporation was very obviously used as a means to perpetuate an
injustice; thus piercing law had to be kept purposefully vague.).
204. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 445.
205. PB Real Estate, Inc. v. Dem II Prop., 719 A.2d 73, 74 (Conn. App. 1998).
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application of the veil piercing standards. As Steven C. Bahls points
out:
[t]he combination of selected corporate and partnership attributes
creates difficulties for courts when deciding whether to apply com-
mon-law corporate and partnership doctrines to limited liability
companies. The unique combination of these corporate and com-
mon-law doctrines makes it inappropriate to apply all corporate
common-law rules or all partnership common-law rules without
modification.206
As discussed in Section VII, a number of the corporate common
law standards, (such as adherence to corporate formalities and the al-
ter ego standard), do not translate well to LLC's. This is partly attrib-
utable to some of the partnership-like qualities that LLC's may
possess, such as de-centralized management. In addition, application
of the traditional common law standards for piercing the corporate
veil would fail to consider relevant LLC factors that may indicate
when the LLC should be pierced. 207 As an example, the traditional
corporate piercing standards would not test an LLC to see that the
managers and members are operating the LLC in compliance with the
applicable LLC statute, the articles of organization, and/or the LLC's
operating agreement. Much like the adherence to corporate formali-
ties factor, these issues could provide evidence that the entity was be-
ing abused or used for improper purposes.
Therefore, as shown above, the wholesale application of the corpo-
rate common law standards to LLC's is hampered by the unique char-
acteristics of LLC's. Considering the well-documented shortcomings
of the corporate piercing standards, the measurable differences be-
tween corporations and LLC's, and the practical difficulties in apply-
ing the corporate standards to LLC's, the pertinent question should
not be: "Do we need a new standard?"; but instead "What new or
modified standard should we adopt?" Regardless of the final out-
come of the debate over LLC piercing standards, "blind faith" in the
traditional corporate standards should not be deemed an acceptable
means to the end. To have any hope of long term success, the prevail-
ing piercing standards must be the product of a meaningful legislative,
judicial and scholarly analysis of the piercing issues as they relate to
LLC's. 20 8
206. Bahls, supra note 9, at 90-91.
207. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 354.
208. See id.
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D. Early Proposals
Over the past eight to ten years, commentators have offered several
different adaptations of the traditional corporate veil piercing stan-
dards in an effort to rectify the apparent problems. Despite their
commendable efforts to patch up the system, the proposals fall short
of providing an effective, comprehensive system capable of weighing
the pertinent factors and assessing fraud, abuse of the LLC, and other
forms of wrongful conduct and unfairness.
Submitting his commentary in 1994, Eric Fox's ("Fox") proposal
starts by eliminating both the corporate formality factor and the alter
ego factor from the equation. Fox concludes that both factors do not
translate well to LLC's. 20 9 He then acknowledges that if undercapital-
ization is the only factor present in a veil-piercing case, most courts
would hold the evidence insufficient to pierce. Therefore, Fox advo-
cates the liberalization of the undercapitalization standard, adding
that fraud and undercapitalization should be the sole bases for pierc-
ing.210 Fox justifies this approach with two main arguments: first, in
tort cases, requiring adequate capital in LLC's will discourage mem-
bers from undertaking high-risk ventures and ensure that tort claim-
ants have an avenue of recourse; secondly, in contract cases, adequate
capital will eliminate the need for due diligence background checks on
the part of potential contract creditors, and eliminate the need for
personal assurances - thereby reducing transaction costs. 211
The most significant flaw in the Fox proposal is its over-reliance on
undercapitalization. As discussed in Section VII, above, there are se-
rious questions surrounding the application of the undercapitalization
factor and courts have rarely found it sufficient by itself to pierce the
veil. Intense scrutiny of LLC capitalization fails to value the impor-
tance of highly leveraged business start-ups and ignores the barriers
that such a standard will present to new business development. In
addition, application of undercapitalization alone will fail to suffi-
ciently test for other forms of wrongful conduct such as self-dealing
and commingling.
In 1997, Karin Schwindt ("Schwindt") proposed more of a bifur-
cated system.2 12 According to her proposal, contract cases would be
209. Fox, supra note 8, at 1174 (concluding that "[f]irst, failure to follow formalities should not
hinder an LLC's veil because the LLC's few statutory formalities are intended to be less burden-
some. Second, lack of separateness between members and the entity should not apply to LLC's
because they are intended to be managed by members.").
210. See id. at 1174-1177.
211. See id. at 1176.
212. Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1563-1565.
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treated differently than tort cases. 213 In contract cases, Schwindt sug-
gests that courts look primarily to the alter ego factor or the "disre-
gard of the LLC's separateness" in deciding whether or not to pierce
the LLC veil.214 Unlike undercapitalization, which can be pre-
screened in a contractual relationship, Schwindt asserts that disregard
of separateness is a potential source of misleading and unfair conduct
that should weigh heavily in the contract setting.215 In tort cases, she
proposes that undercapitalization be the most heavily considered fac-
tor.216 Schwindt argues that adequate capitalization and insurance
should be expected and that "[a]llowing the use of the LLC veil to
escape possible liabilities would encourage fundamental unfairness
and place the burden of recompensing tort victims on society rather
than on the entity on which it belongs. ' 217
Schwindt's system, despite its logic, would prove to be overly-re-
strictive to courts attempting actual application of the system. By pre-
designating the factor for each type of case before the facts and cir-
cumstances are known, Schwindt's system would tie the hands of the
Court in cases where an alternative standard would be more suitable.
For example, in a tort case, an LLC may be sufficiently capitalized, yet
lack the degree of separateness required to avoid a piercing under the
common law. In addition, much like the Fox proposal, Schwindt's
proposal relies too heavily on undercapitalization in tort cases - a
practice that courts have apparently refused to adopt.218
In 1998, David Cohen ("Cohen") proposed a novel step-by-step
procedure to analyze the veil-piercing question. 219 In formulating the
list, Cohen garnered support from the underlying principles of limited
liability and the doctrines of unconscionability and good faith.220 Co-
hen proposed that the Court take the following steps before deciding
to pierce the veil of an LLC:
First, courts should determine the size of the LLC, and whether it is
traded on secondary markets. The greater the size of an LLC, and
the more it is traded on secondary markets, the more limited liabil-
ity contributes to the efficient running of the LLC (and markets in
general). Second, courts should determine whether the creditor was
voluntary or involuntary. An involuntary creditor will more than
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1564-1565.
215. See id. at 1564.
216. See id. at 1565.
217. Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1565.
218. See Fox, supra note 8, at 1162 ("undercapitalization infrequently is sufficient by itself to
pierce the veil"); see also, Fox, supra note 8, at 1158 n.112.
219. Cohen, supra note 5, at 490-492.
220. See id. at 490.
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likely not have consented to his relationship with the LLC, whereas
a voluntary creditor could have and should have factored in the
risks of contracting with a limited liability entity into their original
bargain. Third, courts should determine whether the LLC is mem-
ber managed or managed by agents. The more use made of agents,
the greater importance limited liability and the efficient running of
secondary markets assumes in running the firm. Fourth, courts
should inquire whether the case at hand involves fraud, misrepre-
sentation, an omission or coercion. If it did, then the creditor proba-
bly consented under false pretenses and the LLC bargained in bad
faith. Thus, the reasonable expectations of the creditor cannot be
fulfilled, by definition. Fifth, courts should inquire whether the
LLC was formed with the explicit intent of engaging in risky behav-
ior and being undercapitalized for the likely liabilities. If an LLC
was formed with such a purpose, this fact should be extra evidence
of the unconscionable behavior of the firm toward involuntary cred-
itors. However, such evidence should not be evidence of uncon-
scionable behavior toward voluntary creditors unless the LLC's
purpose was obscured or misrepresented. Sixth, courts should de-
termine whether the members of the LLC failed to respect the sepa-
rate entity of the LLC by using the LLC's credit to secure loans to
members, by using LLC property as if it belonged to members, or
by generally failing to hold the firm out as a separate entity. By
engaging in such behavior, the LLC members are not fulfilling the
promise of the democratic argument - increasing opportunities for
risk-taking across a wide socio-economic spectrum - but are abusing
a legal technology in order to mislead potential creditors about the
member's personal wealth. 221
Despite offering a valuable list of important considerations, Cohen's
proposal fails to offer a suggestion as to how the six considerations
should be wrapped up into one final decision. For example, should
some of the steps carry more weight than others? How does the court
determine the final outcome of the piercing question? Interestingly,
Cohen follows up his proposal by summarily discounting its likelihood
of actual application.22 2 He concedes that it is unlikely that a legisla-
ture or court would adopt a step-by-step test for fear that the exis-
tence of a test would encourage courts to pierce and such a test would
encourage firms to adjust their actions in such a way as to facilitate
abusive behavior while circumventing the events that trigger
piercings. 223
221. Id. at 490-491.
222. See id. at 491, ("[i]t is unlikely that the legislature or courts in Delaware, or elsewhere for
that matter, will provide a step by step test for determining whether or not to pierce an LLC's
veil.").
223. Cohen, supra note 5, at 491.
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E. Summary
With the corporate veil piercing standards in such disarray, and
their application to LLC's so awkward, there exists a real need for a
new standard for piercing the veil of LLC's. While the proposals of
Fox, Schwindt and Cohen fall short of providing one comprehensive
standard to improve the current system, their efforts provide valuable
incite and succeed in moving us closer to our goal.
F. Goals for a New Standard
As with any proposed change, the challenge is to propose a system
that is better than the current one. In order to attain that goal, we
first need to define what qualities a good piercing standard will pos-
sess. To start with, the standard should offer a balance between the
affected parties. It should: (1) provide guidance to the courts in map-
ping out the LLC piercing decision; (2) provide creditors with an equi-
table remedy; and (3) provide LLC members with clear guidance as to
the proper way to operate and maintain an LLC. 224 Secondly, the new
standard must bring some certainty to this area of the law. That is
where marked improvements can be made. In reflecting upon the
goals for their proposed standard, Matheson & Eby remarked: the
"[a]doption of a single, statutory set of standards for loss of limited
liability would bring significant certainty to this area of the law.
Courts addressing this issue of piercing for [LLC's] would apply a con-
sistent test, eliminating free-form decisionmaking. ' '225 Lastly, it is im-
portant not to draw too much from comparisons to similar entities.
Warren Johnson warns against this: "[a]void the temptation of the
metaphor that tries to characterize the LLC as 'like' something that it
is not, and instead [ *** ] analyze the LLC as the separate and distinct
entity which the state legislatures intended. ' 226
X. THE MATHESON-EBY MODEL STANDARD
Having critically analyzed some of the early proposals for LLC
piercing standards, this article now turns to a model standard pro-
posed in January, 2000. In introducing their model standard, John
Matheson and Raymond Eby have done a commendable job of as-
sembling a standard from which commentators can base a discussion
224. See generally Huss, supra note 2, at 123-124 (suggesting that a legislative solution to the
veil piercing standard problem should include clear guidelines for courts, equitable remedies for
creditors, and clear guidelines for LLC operations.).
225. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 152.
226. Johnson, supra note 83, at 198.
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on the necessary elements of a new LLC piercing standard.227 Mathe-
son and Eby assert that the standard will have universal applicability
to corporations as well as other forms of limited liability entities, such
as limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships. 228
Without commenting on the feasibility of this bold approach, this arti-
cle will focus on the application of the standard to LLC's.
A. Features of the Matheson - Eby Model Standard
As a condition precedent to an owner's personal liability, the model
standard requires that the LLC "be or become" insolvent. 229 If this
condition is met, the proposed test identifies three situations in which
an LLC member will be found to have waived the statutory limited
liability protection.230 First, an LLC member shall be held to have
waived the shield when the member uses the LLC to commit a fraud
involving material misrepresentations of the assets of the enter-
prise. 231 In this case, the owner shall be responsible for all of the
LLC's debts.
Under the second test, the LLC member waives his/her limited lia-
bility when the member causes the LLC to transfer assets or incur
obligations to the member or some entity in which the owner has a
material interest for less than reasonably equivalent value. 232 The au-
thors describe this transaction as a "conflicted exchange. ' 233 Mem-
bers engaging in such transfers are automatically liable to creditors for
the amount transferred in excess of a reasonably equivalent
amount. 234 If however, it is shown that the conflicted exchange
caused the subsequent insolvency of the LLC, the creditor shall be
entitled to recover the entire amount due from the personal assets of
the member without regard for the amount of the overpayment. 235
Lastly, if the LLC makes a distribution of assets to a member, in
recognition of and as a return on the member's membership interest,
and the distribution causes the subsequent insolvency of the LLC,
creditors shall be entitled to recover the entire amount due from the
227. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 183-187.
228. Id. at 151-152.
229. Id. at 184.
230. Id. at 183-187.
231. Id. at 184.
232. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 183-184.
233. Id. ("Conflicted Exchange means a transfer of money or other property from a Limited
Liability Entity to an Owner of that Limited Liability Entity (or to any other organization in
which the Owner has a material financial interest) in exchange for services, goods, or other
tangible or intangible property of less than reasonably equivalent value.").
234. Id. at 183-185.
235. Id.
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personal assets of the owner. 236. Matheson and Eby call this an "insol-
vency distribution". 237 To establish the member's unlimited liability
under this test, the creditor must show that the member, at the time of
the insolvency distribution, "knew that the [LLC] was insolvent or
should have reasonably foreseen that the insolvency distribution
would render [the LLC] insolvent. ' 238 If the creditor is only able to
prove the occurrence of the insolvency distribution, the LLC mem-
ber's liability is limited to the amount of the distribution. 239
B. General Comments on the Standard
By far, the most admirable feature of the Matheson-Eby approach
is that it turns the focus of the inquiry back on the wrongful conduct
of the LLC member. Instead of getting caught up in such issues as
corporate formalities, corporate management structures, or the level
of capitalization, the central focus of the model standard is the culpa-
bility of the LLC member. This design is based on Matheson and
Eby's belief that "[l]ack of honesty in form and in substance should be
the sole reason for waiving statutory limited liability. '240 The model
standard is designed in such a way that it is the member's own volun-
tary acts that lead to the waiver of the member's limited liability.24
1
The authors note: "[b]y restating the issue in terms of the owner's
waiver rather than the court's factor balancing, the test more clearly
identifies the owner's own wrongful actions as the source of the
owner's loss of limited-liability protection. 242
Another positive feature of the model standard is its specific treat-
ment of the conflicted exchange and the insolvency distribution. Both
of these tests address intentional misconduct that is meant to thwart
the efforts of third party claimants. Unlike the common law stan-
dards, the reasoning behind the two standards is clear. In the event an
LLC member acts intentionally, in one of these two ways, to wrong-
fully or unfairly prevent a creditor's recovery, the entity will be ig-
nored and the member will be held personally liable for the LLC's
debts and obligations.2 43 The two tests also clearly specify what types
of conduct will amount to a violation and result in a piercing. With
the introduction of the conflicted exchange and insolvency distribu-
236. Id. at 183-184.
237. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 183-184.
238. Id. at 184-185.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 152.
241. See id.
242. Id. at 181.
243. See id. at 152.
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tion standards, Matheson and Eby have accomplished their goal of
bringing certainty to these particular areas.
One important point about the model standard is that it does not
provide a remedy for tort claimants. Matheson and Eby admit that
tort claimants have no basis to compel a piercing under the model
standard, because their claims "place no reliance on the assets of the
business or on the apparent validity of transfers made by the busi-
ness. '244 The authors leave the issue of protecting tort claimants to
the legislatures, pointing out that the legislatures can change the out-
come for tort claimants if they determine that public policy so
demands.245
What Matheson and Eby fail to mention, however, is that the tort
claimant has several "non-piercing" grounds of recovery at his or her
disposal. As discussed in Section III, the limited liability shield pro-
vided by the LLC will not protect a member from personal liability for
their own tortious conduct.246 Liability may also be extended to LLC
members through agency principles and in the case of collective tor-
tious conduct or participation in the relevant conduct.247 Therefore,
even with no piercing basis provided under the model standard, the
only LLC members actually shielded from liability in the case of most
tortious conduct are the passive investors who had no direct connec-
tion to the claimant's injuries. This result is consistent with the basic
tenets of limited liability... encouraging third party capital investment
through the protection of the passive investor.248
C. Fine-tuning the Matheson-Eby Standard
One foreseeable problem with the Model Standard is its narrow
definition of fraud. The standard provides for a waiver of limited lia-
bility when an LLC member: "either directly or through representa-
tions made through the [LLC], fraudulently misrepresents in any
material aspect the assets of the [LLC]". 249 Thus, the standard limits
fraud to a showing of a member's material misrepresentations of the
244. Id. at 186.
245. Id.
246. Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1548.
247. Bahls, supra note 9, at 59-60; Schwindt, supra note 33, at 1548.
248. See Matheson & Eby, supra note 4, at 155-56 ("Granting limited liability to those who
contributed capital encouraged investment because people could invest without risking their full
personal net worth." *** "[ Outside Investors ] are not willing - absent limited liability - to
invest in businesses they themselves do not operate or closely monitor. Limited liability contin-
ues to enable venture capitalists and casual investors to invest in diverse enterprises without
incurring the excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise closely."). Thompson, supra
note 6 at 7-8.
249. Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 184.
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assets of the enterprise.250 Apparently, Matheson and Eby opted for
the narrow definition of fraud in order to avoid opening the flood-
gates to a wide-array of loosely defined fraud claims. In discussing the
proper construction of the fraud factor, the authors state: "[i]n con-
trast to the open-ended, free-form use of these terms today, however,
the focus must be reconstituted in a clear test that requires specific
evidence of fraud. '251 They later add: "[m]isrepresenting the exis-
tence or value of assets on company financial statements may be the
most usual behavior of this type. '252 While it may not be a bad idea to
rein in the free flow of fraud claims, and it may also be the case that
misrepresentations of the company assets are the most common type,
the standard as written will fail to provide a remedy to entire catego-
ries of defrauded parties.
As discussed in Section III (D), a piercing of the veil of limited
liability is intended to be an equitable remedy utilized when a limited
liability entity is used by a party to perpetuate a wrong or injustice.
Consistent with this philosophy, fraud, in its various forms, has gener-
ally been held as sufficient grounds to justify a piercing.253 Therefore,
the traditional message has been that, if you wish to enjoy the benefits
of the shield of limited liability, fraud will not be tolerated. For the
Model Standard to provide for a piercing only in cases involving
fraudulent misrepresentation of entity assets, but not in other cases of
fraud, would unfairly preclude recovery for many other defrauded
parties. In the case of fraud, the Model Standard casts too small of a
net.
Fraud has been defined as "[a]n intentional perversion of truth for
the purpose of inducing another in reliance. . . A false representa-
tion. . .which deceives. . .another so that he shall act upon it to his
legal injury. '254 The term is defined broadly enough to encompass an
assortment of false representations. The types of actions or behaviors
that constitute a fraud have generally not been strictly defined by the
courts. 255 However, certain types of misrepresentations have fre-
quently appeared in piercing cases involving contract claims.256 In ad-
dition to misrepresentations concerning the entity's assets and/or
financial status, there are misrepresentations relating to the entity's
performance and misrepresentations that someone besides the entity
250. See id. at 182-184.
251. Id. at 178.
252. Id. at 188.
253. See Huss, supra note 2, at 112; Fox, supra note 8, at 1156.
254. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
255. See Huss, supra note 2, at 112.
256. See id.
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will guarantee the debt.257 Fraud has also been found when a corpora-
tion was organized merely to protect shareholders from the claims of
creditors and when corporate shareholders drain the entity's assets
leaving it severely undercapitalized. 258 As these examples demon-
strate, there are a number of different types of fraud that should trig-
ger a piercing under the Model Standard. Parties who have been
defrauded by an LLC member should not be denied recovery because
they were not defrauded in the specified manner. To prevent de-
frauded parties from bearing the loss caused by a fraudulent LLC
member, the Model Standard should be revised to provide for pierc-
ing in cases where actual fraud of any kind is shown.259
D. Constructive Fraud And Wrongful Conduct
Critics of the Matheson-Eby Model Standard will undoubtedly ar-
gue that the standard is too limited in its protection and that too many
injured parties will be left without a remedy. As discussed in Section
IX, some critics will argue that the equitable doctrine of piercing the
veil must be kept vague to: (1) ensure it can reach any wrong or injus-
tice; and (2) prevent intentional circumvention. As one commentator
argued, a set test would "encourage firms to adjust their actions in
such a way as to still engage in 'bad' behavior but simultaneously to
avoid the 'bright lines' that would result in piercing. ' '26° Under the
Matheson-Eby standard, even if expanded to cover all cases of actual
fraud, the standard will fall short of providing a remedy for non-fraud-
ulent cases resulting in a wrong or injustice. Notably, under the com-
mon law standards, courts have generally not required a finding of
actual fraud in order to pierce the veil of limited liability.261 There-
fore, in order to preserve the courts' ability to provide equitable reme-
dies in cases of wrong and injustice, notwithstanding the absence of
actual fraud, I would propose that the liability section of the Model
Standard read as follows:
257. See id.
258. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 48, at 355.
259. Utilizing a standard of actual fraud in piercing cases will not be a novel idea. In Texas,
for example, LLC members are held personally liable in cases of actual fraud. See e.g. Cohen-
Whelan, supra note 48, at 353, (citing Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.21A(2) (Supp. 1998)).
260. Cohen, supra note 5, at 491.
261. See, e.g., Kaycee Land and Livestock, 46 P.3d at 328 (quoting Eric Fox, Piercing the Veil
of Limited Liablity Companies, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1143, 1169 (1994))("Liability on the basis
of fraud, however, does not encompass the entire spectrum of cases in which the veil was pierced
in the interest of equity."); West Concord Conservation Club, Inc. v. Chilson, 306 N.W.2d 893,
898 n. 3 (Minn. 1981).
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LIABILITY OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OWNERS
A. Imposition of Liability. Except as expressly provided in the or-
ganizational statute of a Limited Liability Company or in other
statutes regulating the activities and operations of a Limited
Liability Company, or by express agreement of the Members,
no Member of a Limited Liability Company shall be personally
liable for the debts or obligations of the Limited Liability Com-
pany, whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, unless the Lim-
ited Liability Company is or becomes insolvent and:262
1. the Member, either directly or through representations
made through the Limited Liability Company, commits ac-
tual fraud which causes injury to an individual or entity.
2. the Member, either directly or through representations
made through the Limited Liability Company, is shown
through acts or omissions to have committed constructive
fraud, and he/she is shown to have committed or partici-
pated in one or more Wrongful Acts, as defined in this
Model Standard, (below).
3. the Limited Liability Entity participates in a Conflicted Ex-
change; or
4. the Limited Liability Entity makes an Insolvency Distribu-
tion to the Owner.
As written, Section 2 permits the court to find Members personally
liable in cases where the Member has committed constructive fraud,
and it is shown that the Member committed or participated in one or
more wrongful acts as listed in the Model Standard. The goal of the
amendment is to preserve the equitable nature of the veil piercing
remedy by permitting adequate flexibility, while at the same time con-
structing a standard with enough certainty to permit lawful LLC mem-
bers to invest in the entity with the assurances of true limited liability.
Constructive fraud was introduced to the Model Standard to pro-
vide injured parties an equitable remedy in cases where they have suf-
fered a wrong or injustice, but are unable to prove actual fraud.
Constructive fraud exists "where conduct though not actually fraudu-
lent, has all actual consequences and all legal effects of actual
fraud. '263 The term has been defined as an "unintentional deception
or misrepresentation that causes injury to another" 264, and as:
.. any act, statement or omission which amounts to positive fraud
or which is construed as fraud by the courts because of its detrimen-
tal effect upon public interests and public or private confidences. It
requires neither actual dishonesty nor intent to deceive, being a
breach of a legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral
262. See Matheson & Eby, supra note 2, at 184.
263. Klein, supra note 123, at 145, (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 314 (6th ed. 1990)).
264. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 671 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "fraud").
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guilt of the wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its
tendency to deceive others. 26
5
Generally speaking, constructive fraud differs from actual fraud in
that proof of intent is not necessary to establish a claim of constructive
fraud.2 66 Courts have cited constructive fraud as sufficient grounds
for piercing the corporate veil when evidence of actual fraud is not
present.267
Constructive fraud has commonly been applied in cases where the
parties have less than an arms-length relationship, usually involving a
duty between the parties.268 In this context, constructive fraud has
been defined as "the breach of a legal or equitable duty which the law
declares fraudulent because it violates a fiduciary relationship.
' 269
In 1988, in Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil Energy Corp., Inc., the Montana
Supreme Court noted a line of Montana cases supporting the theory
that there must be a breach of a fiduciary relationship in an action for
constructive fraud.270 One such case held: "Constructive fraud is a
breach of fiduciary duty. (Citations omitted). If there is no fiduciary
duty in the first place, constructive fraud will not lie."'271 Despite the
noted cases, the Drilcon court followed an alternative line of cases
recognizing an exception to the fiduciary duty requirement. The ex-
ception provides that under "special circumstances", neither a confi-
dential relationship nor a fiduciary relationship is needed to find
constructive fraud. 272 As defined by the Drilcon court, special circum-
stances exist whenever "[a] party, by his words or conduct creates a
false impression concerning serious impairments or other important
matters and subsequently fails to disclose relevant factors.
'273
265. Tome Engenharia E. Tranportes, Ltd. v. Malki, No. 94 C 7427, 1996 WL 172286, at *6
(N.D.IlI Apr. 11, 1996); (citing Index Futures Group, Inc. v. Ross, 557 NE.2d 344, 349 (Ill.App.
Ct. 1990); See also, Muhl v. Tiber Holding Corp., 18 F.Supp.2d 514 (E.D.Pa. 1998) (citing South-
ern Indus., Inc. v. Jeremias, 66 A.D.2d 178, 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)(defining constructive
fraud as a "breach of a duty which, irrespective of moral guilt and intent, the law declares fraud-
ulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate a confidence or to injure public or private
interests which the law deems worthy of special protection.").
266. See Muhl., 18 F. Supp.2d at 518.
267. See, e.g. West Concord Conservation Club, Inc. v. Chilson, 306 N.W.2d 893, 898 n.3
(Minn. 1979); Miller & Schroeder, Inc. v. Gearman, 413 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
268. See, e.g., Bado Equipment Co., Inc., v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 814 S.W.2d 464, 475
(Texas 1991); Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Texas 1975); Archer v. Griffith, 390
S.W.2d 735, 740 (Texas 1964).
269. See Bado Equipment Co., 814 S.W.2d at 475 (Texas 1991).
270. Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil Energy Corp., Inc., 749 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Mont. 1988).
271. Rowland v. Klies, 726 P.2d 310, 316 (Mont. 1986)(quoting Morse v. Espeland, 696 P.2d
428, 430 (Mont. 1985).
272. Drilcon, 749 P.2d at 1061.
273. Id. at 1061-1062 (finding that special circumstances existed based on evidence of an im-
properly perfected corporate entity, failure to disclose corporate imperfections to creditors, fail-
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Similar to the Montana special circumstances requirement, some
courts and commentators have suggested that while constructive fraud
alone should be insufficient to pierce the veil, constructive fraud in
combination with other elements of wrongdoing should be deemed
sufficient. Two such commentators, critical of the application of con-
structive fraud by itself, noted:
At least two cases... which used constructive fraud as the basis for
disregarding the corporate entity did so in combination with other
elements. Tigrett v. Pointer involved an undercapitalized corpora-
tion, breach of the trust fund doctrine, and a loan by the dominant
shareholder. Cupples Coiled Pipe, Inc. v. Esco Supply Co. was a
products liability case which also involved inadequate capitalization
and loose financial arrangements between the parent and the sub-
sidiary. The existence of factors other than constructive fraud, cou-
pled with strong public policies in favor of predictability and
stability, support these holdings. 27 4
Therefore, while constructive fraud has been criticized by some as too
broad or tenuous a basis to justify a piercing by itself, the combination
of constructive fraud and other elements of wrongdoing provide ade-
quate assurances that a potential veil piercing would be justifiable.
Constructive fraud will give courts more ability to provide the equi-
table remedy of piercing in cases where parties have suffered a wrong
or injustice at the hands of an LLC member. The installation of this
factor should also satisfy critics who would otherwise argue that the
Matheson-Eby standard is too restrictive on courts - since it prevents
courts from providing a remedy in the absence of actual fraud.
Admittedly, authorizing piercing on the basis of constructive fraud
alone could tip the scales unfairly against members of LLC's. With no
showing of intent required, a case of constructive fraud will generally
be too tenuous on its own to justify a piercing. For one thing, con-
structive fraud, as a concept, has "fuzzier edges" and is less susceptible
to precise definition.275 As such, allowing courts to pierce the veil of
LLC's solely on the basis of constructive fraud runs the risk of open-
ing the floodgates to a wide range of piercing scenarios with little
proof of wrongdoing, which would amount to a reversion to the
dreadful vagueness and uncertainty of the corporate common law.
ure to disclose true financial condition of personal guarantor, and failure to disclose that
guarantor was not a corporate officer.)
274. Michael J. Shearn and Peter M. Koelling, Castleberry v. Branscum: A Divided Texas Su-
preme Court Increases Shareholder Liability For Corporate Contractual Obligations, 19 St.
Mary's L.J. 245, 263 - 264 (1987), (citing Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375, 382-83 (Tex. App.
1978); Cupples Coiled Pipe, Inc. v. Esco Supply Co. 591 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. App. 1979)).
275. Rosen v. Matthews Const. Co., Inc., 777 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. App. 1989).
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Yet, rather than discard the factor altogether, the better course is to
require additional proof of wrongdoing in conjunction with construc-
tive fraud to assure the court that the case involves sufficient wrong-
doing or injustice to justify a piercing. This approach draws support
from cases such as Drilcon, Tigrett, and Cupples Coiled Pipe, Inc.,
above, wherein constructive fraud was found sufficient when com-
bined with "special circumstances" or other wrongful factors. Under
the suggested revisions to the Model Standard, the second layer of
proof requires a showing of one or more of the traditional "bad" or
"wrongful" acts which have traditionally been considered strong indi-
cia of abuse of the entity.
E. Proof of Wrongful Conduct
In order to assure itself of a worthy case for piercing the LLC veil,
in addition to a showing of constructive fraud, courts applying the
Model Standard shall require proof of one or more of the following:
(1) Commingling - whether members and managers fail to keep
business funds and accounts separate from funds and accounts of
members, (or) whether members fail to keep their personal books and
financial accounts and records separate from the LLC books.
276
(2) Siphoning of Funds - whether the manager or majority mem-
ber has siphoned funds from the LLC in violation of the articles of
organization, the operating agreement, or the state's LLC statute;
2 77
(3) Gross Undercapitalization - at the time of its formation, or at
the time of the litigated transaction or occurrence, whether the LLC
was grossly undercapitalized, rendering the business unable to satisfy
the reasonably anticipated debts and expenses of the LLC incurred in
the ordinary course of business;
278
(4) Public Notice of The LLC - whether the members fail to hold
the business out as a separate legal entity;
279
(5) The Members Usurp Power - whether the members make de-
cisions for the LLC, thereby usurping the power of the managers, in
direct contravention of the articles of organization and/or operating
agreement;280
(6) Disrespect of the Separate Legal Entity - whether the mem-
bers acted in such a way as to fail to respect the separate legal exis-
tence of the LLC, as shown by such acts as using LLC credit to secure
276. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 458; Bahls, supra note 9, at 64.
277. See Klein, supra note 123, at 136-138.
278. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 458; Bahls, supra note 9, at 64.
279. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 458; Bahls, supra note 9, at 64-65.
280. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 458; Bahls, supra note 9, at 65.
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personal loans, distributing LLC earnings to members through non-
authorized means, members using LLC property as if it were their
own, or other usage of the LLC by members for personal
transactions; 281
(7) Improper Purpose of Formation - whether the LLC was or-
ganized with the purpose of avoiding contractual liabilities, or circum-
venting regulatory statutes or common law duties.282
(8) Breach of Fiduciary Relationship - whether the members'
acts constituted a breach of a legal or equitable duty owed to the in-
jured party, thereby violating a fiduciary relationship.
F. General Comments on the Wrongful Conduct Factors
These eight "wrongful" acts are each indicative of abusive behavior
in connection with the LLC. They were selected based on the follow-
ing two characteristics: (1) they each require a showing of facts that
are probative of wrongful conduct and/or abuses of the entity; and (2)
they are susceptible to bright line tests, allowing for a sense of cer-
tainty and clear definition of the wrongful conduct. With gradual re-
finement, eventually the list will serve as an effective gauge of LLC
activity, capable of identifying abusive conduct.
Several factors traditionally used to evaluate corporations in pierc-
ing cases were intentionally omitted from the wrongful conduct list,
including: (1) lack of corporate formalities;283 (2) nonfunctioning of-
ficers and directors other than shareholders;28 4 and (3) absence of cor-
porate records. 285 Unlike the eight factors chosen, these factors are
more probative of corporate neglect than intentional misuse of the
entity. In addition, the factors are tailored to the characteristics of the
corporation and do not translate well to the unique characteristics of
the LLC.
Factor (8) pertains to cases where the constructive fraud involves
the breach of a fiduciary relationship. Drawing from traditional prin-
ciples of constructive fraud, which required a fiduciary relationship, 286
the injured party may prove that the parties had less than an arm's-
length relationship - one involving a fiduciary relationship and/or legal
duty. If such a fiduciary relationship is proven, no further wrongful
acts need be shown to justify the piercing. The breach of the legal or
281. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 458; Bahls, supra note 9, at 65.
282. See Bahls, supra note 9, at 66.
283. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 458; Klein, supra note 123, at 136-138.
284. See Klein, supra note 123, at 136-138.
285. See id.
286. See, e.g., Bado Equipment Co., Inc., 814 S.W.2d at 475.
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equitable duty owed to the injured party, in conjunction with the con-
structive fraud, provides adequate justification for the piercing.
With regard to factor (3), gross undercapitalization, a few comments
are in order. First, to be considered wrongful conduct, this factor shall
require a higher degree or "gross" case of undercapitalization to en-
sure the culpability necessary to justify a piercing. The modifier
"gross" is included in order to necessitate the showing of a "glaring"
or "flagrant" case of undercapitalization, something more than the
plain vanilla case of inadequate capitalization.
The heightened standard of "gross" undercapitalization has been in-
voked by courts as a way of further reinforcing the case for piercing
the veil, in situations where the court may have otherwise found mere
undercapitalization insufficient. 287 In addition, gross undercapitaliza-
tion has been utilized as a means of discouraging frequent adjudica-
tion of undercapitalization issues.288  By adopting the "gross"
standard, these courts have essentially raised the bar for parties seek-
ing to pierce the veil on the basis of inadequate capitalization.
The basic standard of inadequate capitalization tests whether a cor-
poration has sufficient capital to cover its reasonably anticipated lia-
bilities as measured by the nature and magnitude of its undertaking,
the risks attendant to the particular enterprise and the normal operat-
ing costs associated with the business.289 In contrast to the basic stan-
dard, gross undercapitalization requires proof of: "[a]n obvious
inadequacy of capital;" "no attempt to provide adequate capitaliza-
tion;" or "capital trifling compared with the business to be done and
the risks of loss. ' 29° Arizona courts, for example, require "more than
mere unprofitability for an enterprise to be considered undercapital-
ized, the amount of capital must be 'illusory or trifling."' 291 As
shown, gross undercapitalization necessitates an exaggerated showing
of capital deficiency that leaves little doubt that an abuse of the entity
has occurred.
In addition to the degree of undercapitalization required, it is also
important to consider the timing of the assessment. There are two
points in time in which the LLC must be judged. First, a piercing shall
be permitted if the LLC is grossly undercapitalized at the time of its
287. See e.g., Keams v. Tempe Technical Inst., Inc., 993 F.Supp. 714, 724 (D. Ariz. 1997); Har-
vey Gelb, CERCLA Versus Corporate Limited Liability, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 111, 122 (1999).
288. See Gelb, supra note 287, at 122.
289. See Stirling-Wanner v. Pocket Novels, Inc., 879 P.2d 210, 213 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
290. Harvey Gelb, Piercing The Corporate Veil - The Undercapitalization Factor, 59 CHI.-
KErrr L. REv. 1, 14 (1982).
291. Keams, 993 F. Supp. at 724 (citing Norris Chemical Co. v. Ingram, 679 P.2d 567, 570
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)).
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formation.292 Piercing under these circumstances is necessary to pro-
tect the reasonable expectations of parties dealing with the LLC, be-
cause creditors and other individuals (including consumers and other
business persons), "do not expect LLC's to be grossly undercapital-
ized at the date of formation. ' 293 Thus, assessment of the LLC at for-
mation is aimed at preventing business planners and LLC members
from "deliberately or recklessly" capitalizing an LLC so inadequately
that they violate the reasonable expectations of those dealing with the
business, 294 while at the same time discouraging the temptation of in-
adequately capitalized firms to engage in unacceptably risky
activities. 295
While it is apparent that the LLC's capitalization should be judged
at the time of formation, it seems equally apparent that the current
circumstances of the LLC, existing at the time of the triggering event,
incident and/or injury, must also be assessed. 296 Courts have recog-
nized that "the obligation to provide adequate capital begins with in-
corporation and is a continuing obligation thereafter. . .during the
corporation's operations. '297 This is the case because the financial
condition of the LLC may have changed drastically, along with the
LLC ownership, over the life of the LLC. Indeed, the LLC may have
gone through multiple cycles of adequate capitalization and gross un-
dercapitalization prior to the date it first encountered the relevant
creditor or third party. In the interim period of time, a grossly under-
capitalized firm may have received an ample capital infusion, while a
generously capitalized entity may have been subjected to reckless si-
phoning of funds to the point of undercapitalization. As one com-
mentator noted:
The determination of the adequacy of the level of assets provided
for a corporation should not be frozen arbitrarily as suggested by
courts which stress only capitalization at the inception of the corpo-
ration. Certainly, for example, at some point in time after funds fall
below the level deemed appropriate for providing the requisite de-
gree of creditor protection, such deficiency should afford a basis for
292. See Stirling-Wanner, 879 P.2d at 213 (noting that the sufficiency of capital is determined
at the time a corporation is formed and at the beginning of its operation); Gardner v. First
Escrow Corp., 696 P.2d 1172, 1178 (1985).
293. See Bahls, supra note 9, at 66.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. This view has been embraced by several courts and commentators. See, e.g., Dewitt
Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing
James R. Gillespie, The Thin Corporate Line: Loss of Limited Liability Protection, 45
N.D.L.Rev. 363 377-8 (1969)); Dix, Adequate Risk Capital, 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 478, 494 (1958).
297. Dewitt Truck Brokers, Inc., 540 F.2d at 686.
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disregarding the corporate entity. So too it should be recognized
that an initially inadequate level of assets can be cured.
298
For the reasons stated here, courts should be permitted to consider
the current level of capitalization of the entity, along with the levels
for a reasonable period of time leading up to the triggering event
(such as the preceding 12 months) in order to decide whether the cur-
rent LLC members were operating the LLC under conditions of gross
undercapitalization.
G. Legislative Exceptions to Limited Liability, (e.g.
Products Liability)
Assuming for a moment that a version of the Matheson-Eby stan-
dard were adopted, there may be those who evaluate the new system
and conclude that there are certain groups that are not sufficiently
protected by the standard. Legislatures and courts in some states
have already limited the usage of LLC's to prevent abuse and inequity
under certain circumstances, as with the Ohio Supreme Court rule
that attorneys practicing in LLC's must maintain a specified level of
malpractice insurance in order to obtain limited liability.
299
One example of an area where special attention may be necessary is
products liability. Under our system of jurisprudence, special protec-
tions, including strict liability, have been carved out for victims of
manufacturing and/or product defects. The rule of strict liability in
defective product cases causes a person who sells a product "in a de-
fective condition [un]reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer"
to be liable to the ultimate user or consumer for any harm caused by
use of the product if "(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold. ' '3°° Over many years of observation and discussion, these pro-
tections were deemed necessary to protect the interests of injured
consumers.
The purpose of strict tort liability is "to insure that the costs of inju-
ries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured per-
sons who are powerless to protect themselves."' 30 1 In his famous con-
298. See Gelb, supra note 290, at 18.
299. See Rule III of the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar, 2001 ed.
300. Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. 1969) (adopting
the rule of strict liability as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A)).
301. Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8 (Calif. 1977) (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Calif. 1963)).
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curring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Justice Traynor
described some of the key justifications for the strict liability doctrine:
Even if there is no negligence, ***, public policy demands that re-
sponsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unpre-
pared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by
the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of do-
ing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing
of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such
products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the pub-
lic interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may
cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the mar-
ket. However intermittently such injuries may occur and however
haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a con-
stant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be
general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situ-
ated to afford such protection.302
Thus, the "paramount policy" being promoted by strict liability "is the
protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects
and the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating
them." 30 3
In addition to strict liability, the area of products liability also offers
special protections to injured parties in the way of successor liability.
Under this doctrine, if a defined set of circumstances are present, the
successor of a manufacturer shall assume strict tort liability for defects
in a product manufactured and distributed by the entity from which
the business was acquired. 30 4 The justifications for imposing strict lia-
bility upon a successor to a manufacturer under these circumstances
have been summarized as:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of
the business, (2) the successor's ability to assume the original
manufacturer's risk-spreading rule, and (3) the fairness of re-
quiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective
products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original
302. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Calif. 1944).
303. Ray, 560 P.2d at 8.
304. See id. at 10-11.
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manufacturer's good will being enjoyed by the successor in the
continued operation of the business.30
5
As shown by the previous examples, special protections have been
fashioned for those injured by defective products. Behind these rules
of liability, lie strong issues of public policy that have provided the
foundation upon which the rules were based.
Similarly, it could be argued that consumers injured by defective
products should not be denied recovery because the most culpable
party is shielded by the limited liability of an LLC. Many of the same
arguments used to justify strict liability, such as deterrence and risk-
shifting, could be used to justify a piercing of the LLC veil. For these
reasons, legislatures may find it necessary to consider special piercing
rules for LLC's involved in the production, distribution, and sale of
consumer or commercial products. For example, to provide for con-
sumer protection in the case of defective products, a state may make
the limited liability of an LLC engaged in consumer sales conditioned
upon mandatory insurance or minimal levels of capitalization. To
minimize the barrier-effect on small business start-ups, such require-
ments could be limited to those entities with a fixed amount of gross
sales - such as $ 1,000,000.00 per fiscal year. Linking limited liability
to insurance and/or minimal capitalization would, in effect, shift the
risk of loss to those parties in the best position to prevent injuries, the
manufacturers, and make consumer protection a cost of doing
business.
As shown by the foregoing products liability example, certain cir-
cumstances may warrant the fashioning of special rules for piercing
the veil of LLC's. Before exploring such exceptional rules, however,
legislatures should test for strong public policy favoring the excep-
tions. Otherwise, limited liability will eventually become so hampered
by exceptions it will offer nothing more than an empty promise.
XI. CONCLUSION
By enacting the LLC statutes, state legislatures in all 50 states have
placed their stamp of approval on this new form of business entity. By
statute, LLC's have been authorized to conduct business with very lit-
tle formality and simple, customized management structures. The
practical benefits of the LLC have quickly made it the entity-of-choice
for many new business start-ups. 30 6 Unfortunately, the application of
traditional corporate veil-piercing standards to LLC's has called into
305. Id. at 8-9.
306. As an example of the rapid growth in the relative popularity of the LLC, (versus the
corporation), according to the records of the Ohio Secretary of State, J. Kenneth Blackwell,
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question the reliability of the limited liability protection offered by the
entity.
A better standard for piercing the veil of LLC's is currently within
our grasp. The alternative is not a good one. Continuing to mechani-
cally apply corporate piercing doctrines to LLC's will lead to unac-
ceptable outcomes. The same vision and forward-thinking that led to
the enactment of the LLC should now be concentrated on the devel-
opment of a piercing standard specially designed to fit the unique
characteristics of the LLC. The Matheson-Eby Model Standard offers
an excellent starting point for the discussion. In carving out the
Model Standard, Matheson and Eby show how a better standard can
be designed through analysis of the interests and principles that are
applicable to the unique circumstances surrounding the LLC. For a
new standard to be effective, the proper balance must be struck be-
tween providing honest business owners security in knowing that their
limited liability shield is not in jeopardy, while preventing fraudulent
or unscrupulous owners from hiding behind the shield of limited
liability.
With a few modifications, the Matheson-Eby Model Standard
would be better-equipped to preserve equity and combat abusive be-
havior. A broader definition of fraud, for example, would allow
courts to remedy more types of fraudulent misconduct. In addition,
the incorporation of the constructive fraud concept, in conjunction
with a finite list of wrongful acts, would strike the right balance be-
tween equity and guidance.
Love or hate these particular proposals, it is time we rolled up our
sleeves and got to work on a better standard. Only through analysis
and discussion will we know whether a better standard is attainable.
Just because we cannot see clearly the end of the road, that is no
reason for not setting out on the essential journey. On the contrary,
great change dominates the world, and unless we move with change
we will become its victims.
Robert F. Kennedy, 1964307
25,067 domestic LLC's were filed in Ohio in 2002, as compared to the 18,483 domestic corpora-
tions filed in Ohio during the same period.
307. Shrager & Frost, supra note 1, at 38 (quoting Robert F. Kennedy's Farewell Statement,
Warsaw, Poland, reported in the New York Times, July 2, 1964).
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